Population and Urbanization*

The urban drama of the developing countries is intimately linked in many complex ways with high fertility and rapid population growth

By Rafael M. Salas

Urban population dynamics

Urban dwellers are rapidly becoming a majority of the population. Most of them live in developing countries, and an ever-higher proportion in the biggest cities. Most of the world’s largest cities are now in developing countries, and they are growing to sizes never before experienced. The urban population is growing several times as fast as in the rural areas, either through natural growth (the difference in numbers between births and deaths) or through migration from rural areas. But rural population in developing countries will continue to grow.

* The author of this paper is the Executive Director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). A more detailed paper on this topic will be delivered at the International Conference on Population and the Urban Future, which will be held at Barcelona from 19 to 22 May 1986.
Table 1. Proportion of population living in urban areas (per cent)

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<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions(a)</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions(b)</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(a\) Northern America, Japan, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

\(b\) All others.

Population dynamics, the forces behind the growth and movement of populations, play a central part in the urbanization process. The urban drama of the developing countries is intimately linked in many complex ways with high fertility and rapid population growth.

More than 40 per cent of world population currently lives in urban areas (table 1). This will increase to more than 50 per cent shortly after the turn of the century. Developed regions have been more than 50 per cent urban since the mid-20th century. Developing countries are expected to pass the mark in the first quarter of the next century.

Within the less developed regions there are important differences. The developing countries of Asia and Africa are less than 30 per cent urban. Latin America is nearly 70 per cent urban, reflecting that region’s stage of development and the peculiarities of its urban structure and history.

Behind the percentages lie important implications. Not least among them is the fact that within the next 50 years, the mainly rural character of developing countries will be gone forever. No development policies, or population policies for that matter, can afford to ignore the fact.
Table 2. Urban population (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>5,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions (a)</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions (b)</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>3,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(a) Northern America, Japan, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(b) All others.

In 1970 the total urban population of the more developed regions was almost 30 million more than in the less developed (table 2). Only five years later the position was reversed and by 1985 the difference had widened to more than 300 million. By the year 2000 the urban population of developing countries will be almost double that of the developed. By the year 2025 it will be almost four times as large.

The urban population of Africa is now smaller than that of North America. By the beginning of next century Africa’s urban population is expected to be substantially greater, and three times greater by the year 2025.

One very important conclusion is clear. Even if some developing countries move into the ranks of the developed in the meantime, the urban problems of developing regions will be much larger than in the past.

The share of world population living in the largest cities will almost double between 1970 and 2025, because of the growth of very large cities in developing countries. By 2025 almost 30 per cent of urban population in the developing regions will be living in cities of over 4 million, more than double the figure for the more developed regions.
By the year 2000 there will be five “supercities” of 15 million or more, three of them in the developing regions.

In 1970, of the 20 largest cities in the world, nine were in the less developed regions. Ten cities in the developing regions reached the ranks of the 20 largest in 1985 and by the year 2000 sixteen of the 20 largest cities will be in the less developed regions.

With this shift, the intimate relationship between large cities and economic development will have been broken. Until recently their size made large cities the centre of international political and economic networks. This perception may now begin to change.

Many developing countries will have to plan for cities of sizes never dreamed of in currently developed countries. High population growth in developing countries, whatever other factors enter the process, is inseparable from this phenomenon.

This does not mean that population growth in the largest cities is always higher than in medium and small cities. In some parts of Latin America, for example, smaller cities are now growing faster than the largest cities. But even a moderate rate of growth in a large city means huge additions to the population. A city of 5 million inhabitants growing at 1.5 per cent a year (very moderate for such cities in most developing countries) will acquire more than 800,000 additional inhabitants in 10 years.

Successfully reducing growth in larger cities will mean faster growth in smaller cities. But faster growth may produce its own problems if, for instance, services cannot be expanded quickly enough to cope with increasing numbers. Thus, smaller cities could lose their attraction.

World population growth peaked between 1965 and 1970 at an average annual rate of 2.04 per cent. The current rate is 1.63 per cent and slowly declining.

World urban population growth, on the other hand, will remain at about 2.5 per cent into the first quarter of the 21st century. At this rate, world urban population will double in about 28 years.

Urban population growth in developing countries is currently three times the rate of developed countries, at about 3.5 per cent a year, a doubling time of only 20 years.

There are important differences between the developing regions. Latin America has the lowest rates of population growth. Asia comes next. Africa, especially Eastern Africa, has the highest. The current rate for Africa is 5 per
cent, implying a doubling of its urban population every 14 years. The current figure for East Africa is above 6.5 per cent, a doubling time of little more than 10 years.

Such extremely rapid urban growth has never been seen before. It confronts the cities, especially in the developing countries, with problems new to human experience, as well as all the old problems – urban infrastructure, food, housing, employment, health, education – in new and accentuated forms.

Urban population dynamics cannot be considered in isolation from what is happening in the rural areas.

For the remainder of this century the rural population of the less developed regions as a whole will continue to increase at a rate of around 1 per cent annually, adding more than 350 million to the rural population by the century’s end.

Eventually, as countries become more industrialized, the rural population will begin to decrease. This important turning point will be reached for the world and for developing countries in general between 2010 and 2025. It has already been reached in the more developed regions and a few developing countries, notably the Republic of Korea and Malaysia.

There are five important points:

- The current rural population of the world is more than 2,500 million;
- Rural population density is already very high in many parts of the less developed regions. Standards of living, while improving, remain low. It is doubtful whether added population pressure will produce better agricultural development – on the contrary it may pose severe threats to the development of many rural areas;
- Increasing rural population in developing countries will make it difficult to reduce the flow of migrants to the cities. Another point for policy-makers to remember is that rural birth rates are generally higher than urban rates;
- Natural growth (the difference between the number of births and the number of deaths) of the rural population is higher than the 1 per cent rate given here – often more than double. The difference is the number of migrants to the cities;
- For most of Africa, in contrast with the rest of the developing world, rural populations will continue to increase well into the next century. While population densities in Africa are generally lower than in Asia,
Table 3. Differentials in urban and rural fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
<th>Mean number of children born alive in past five years (around 1973)</th>
<th>Always urban adjusted (a)</th>
<th>Always rural adjusted (a)</th>
<th>Differential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Senegal, Sudan and Tunisia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for Americas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia-Pacific</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (outside ESCAP region)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic (outside ESCAP region)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for Asia and Pacific</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average for Asia and Pacific</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average (Africa, Latin America, and Asia and Pacific)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** (a) The table gives rural-urban differences in fertility as measured by the mean number of children born alive in the five years preceding the survey date. The figures have been adjusted for age at first union, respondent’s education, husband’s occupation and respondent’s place of work so as to demonstrate more specifically the difference urban residence makes. “Continuous residence” in the table means that respondents were living in an urban area at the time of the survey and also during their childhood. Urban dwellers who spent their childhood in rural areas have been excluded from the table to capture more accurately the enduring influence of the urban environment.
resource constraints and political problems will make it more difficult for African countries to absorb these additional numbers in the rural population.

At an early stage of development, when levels of urbanization are low and rates of both urban and rural natural increase are moderately high, net migration will be more important to urban population growth than natural increase. At an intermediate stage of urbanization natural increase will predominate. At a late stage, with high levels of urbanization and low rates of natural increase, the relationship may be reversed again in favour of net migration.

A great many urban areas in developing countries are in the intermediate stage. A study by the United Nations Population Division found that between 1960 and 1970 for 26 large cities in 20 countries, 37 per cent of population growth was the result of migration and 63 per cent of natural growth.

In weighing the relative importance of natural growth or net migration in overall urban growth we usually think of migrants who are settling permanently in urban areas. However, recent research has shown that many migrants maintain a circular pattern of movement between rural and urban areas. This is found especially in developing countries with high rural population densities near urban areas. If this pattern is common the differences between natural growth and migration as causes of urban growth become less important than understanding the effect of these migrants.

It is often assumed that urban fertility is lower than rural fertility, but this is not always the case (table 3). The average fertility rate for the countries in Asia and the Pacific does not show any real difference between urban and rural areas. However, in classifying developing countries according to their stage of development as measured by literacy, the difference between rural and urban fertility increases with the level of development. This suggests that as countries go through the “demographic transition” from high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility, the rural-urban difference widens, narrowing again towards the completion of the transition, as in developed countries.

Although urban fertility in developing countries tends to be lower than rural fertility it is still at least twice as high as in developed countries.

When natural increase in the urban areas is high and migrants contribute substantially to it, the migrants’ future fertility becomes an important factor. Rural high fertility may be carried over into the urban environment; more optimistically, migrants plunging into new endeavours in new situations may adapt rather quickly to urban values, including lower fertility. The temporary disruption of the migrants’ lives may also delay or interrupt family formation.
Burdens or blessing?

Although it may have come in disguise, urbanization has usually been seen as a blessing. It is only recently, looking at the explosive growth of cities in developing countries, that this assumption has been challenged. Over-urbanization, urban bias and the parasitic role of cities are the “buzz-words”: the theory compares urbanization today with the experience of Western Europe and concludes that it has become a problem, a burden on the back of development. While population is not root of all urban problems, population dynamics are an important and often neglected factor.

Urban employment and income

Some think that urban growth is a blessing because a higher level of urbanization in a country goes with higher incomes. Social surveys show that migrants are often entrepreneurs on a small scale, building up a productive place in the urban environment. They tend to save more than non-migrants, plan more and often succeed in improving their condition. Their remittances help to support their rural relatives and the rural economy.
However, blessings are allocated unevenly according to circumstances and social group; there are also victims of urbanization, including those outside urban areas.

Some optimists say that rural-urban migrants have probably improved on the very miserable conditions which they left, which compensates for any problems they may face in the city. This is hardly a humane comparison. Even if living conditions are slightly better in the cities, concern for the precarious margin of safety and social welfare of vast numbers of people should go beyond a simplistic “comparative satisfaction” analysis.

The “blessing” theorists hold that migration to the cities is part of a dynamic development process. The “burden” view is that rural surplus population becomes an urban surplus, producing “over-urbanization”, in which an inefficient and unproductive “informal sector” consisting of street vendors, shoeshine boys, sidewalk repair shops and other so-called marginal occupations becomes more and more important. This is contrasted with the modern “formal sector” which is capital-intensive and absorbs workers only above a certain skill level.

On balance the optimistic view is probably closer to the truth. Average wages and income for urban areas are higher than in rural areas, even making allowance for higher living costs in the cities. Open unemployment in most urban areas is not permanently and extraordinarily high. Unemployed urban dwellers in many developing countries tend to be optimists, waiting for the right opening.

**Urbanization and housing problems**

The most visible expressions of the problems of rapid urban population growth are the makeshift settlements on the outskirts of every city in the developing world. They are usually in the worst parts of town for health and accessibility. They lack basic services and any security of tenure. They are by their nature overcrowded: average occupancy rates of four to five persons per room are common.

It is difficult to know what proportion of urban population lives in squatter and slum areas, but it can be very large, sometimes more than half the city population. In Calcutta about one third of the Metropolitan District population lives in temporary single-storey huts which are shared by an average of five persons per hectare (Population Division, 1986). The housing deficit in many large cities is gigantic.
Where squatter settlements have been established near workplaces, they may expose the inhabitants to pollution and dangers such as the leak of poisonous gas in Bhopal, India.

Squatter settlements typically lack water, sewage facilities, removal of solid waste, electricity and paved streets. Because they occupy land owned by the government, private individuals or communal organizations, squatters are frequently subjected to harassment, increasing their feeling of insecurity and precarious existence. Illegal or barely legal occupation does nothing to encourage squatters to improve or even maintain the shaky structures in which they live.

A number of schemes have been devised to give more security to squatters, but there are risks. One is that improving living conditions in the city will encourage people to move there. Another is that improvements to property will increase its value and encourage squatters to sell, moving it out of the reach of other low-income families.

Urban housing in developing countries and areas is the most easily visible expression of the tensions of rapid urban expansion. The successes of Singapore and Hong Kong show that strong-willed and efficient government can produce solutions. The housing policies of these two cities were formulated in a framework of successful economic policies and vigorous family planning programmes.

Health problems in urban areas

Until the balance changed in the late 19th century, urban mortality, especially in the densely populated cities of the industrialized world, was invariably higher in urban than rural areas. Lack of pure water, sanitation and poor health care caused recurrent and deadly epidemics.

In developing countries today urban health conditions seem to be better than in rural areas.

Higher life expectancy in the urban areas of developing countries sound like one of the blessings of urbanization. But, better mortality rates may simply be the result of more investment in the urban health sector - another example of urban bias. Also the evidence for some countries is mixed and most important, the aggregate figures for cities conceal wide and important variations. What little reliable information there is shows that the health of the urban poor may be worse than in rural areas. The overall infant mortality rate for the slums of Delhi is 221 per thousand, twice that for some groups. In the slums of Manila, infant mortality is three times as high, rates for tuberculosis nine times as high
and diarrhoea twice as common as in the rest of the city. Twice as many people are anaemic and three times as many undernourished.

Overcrowding and poverty in slums and squatter settlements are the root causes of poor health in the modern city. Malnutrition, a chronic condition of the urban poor, greatly increases vulnerability to disease, especially among children. Overcrowding increases the likelihood of contagion. Lack of piped water means that there is little to spare for hygiene. The uncovered barrels and drums in which water is kept invite contamination and are ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Roar sanitation and drainage produce stagnant pools and swamps where mosquitoes and other disease carriers breed. Waste and garbage accumulate and support rats, mice and other vermin. In these conditions flourish parasites (hookworm tapeworm, lice), vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue, yellow fever, filariasis), respiratory diseases (bronchitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia), other common infectious diseases (measles, whooping cough) and, above all, diarrhoeal disease (Harpham et al, 1985, Robinson, 1985).

Social conditions in squatter settlements and slums are a threat to physical and mental health. The instability of the family tends to increase the incidence of venereal disease, drug addiction and alcoholism. Mothers who have to work wean their babies too early, exposing them to the risks of poor hygiene, bad water and unsatisfactory baby-food formulas.

Although health in the cities may be better generally than in rural areas, the urban poor may be more at risk than their rural relatives. Rapid population growth, individual poverty and shortage of public funds militate against improvement of health conditions for the urban poor. Their plight holds the whole country back. Urbanization in this form is no blessing.

**Education and urbanization**

Education is a powerful motive for moving to the city. Parents move to give their children a chance; young people, to acquire or improve an education. Partly, this is another example of urban bias at work – rural education has often been neglected in favour of urban – but it is also an essential urban function. Cities have always provided intellectual stimulus and educational leadership. In developing countries there is a consistently higher, often substantially higher, proportion of educated people in the cities.

Migrants also tend to be better educated than those in the communities they leave. Trying to stop this movement might ultimately do more damage than it corrected, trapping such people without a chance to exercise their talents for innovation and entrepreneurship. Rather than put up barriers to exploration of new opportunities, it may be more fruitful to help the rural areas to make sure that they benefit from educational development.
In most cities in developed countries the proportion of young people under 19 is less than 30 per cent of the population. In developing countries it is typically over 40 per cent and may reach 50 per cent in cities such as Manila and Jakarta. If the education system breaks down under this sort of pressure, it will add immeasurably to problems of unemployment, delinquency and allied problems including those of “street children”.

Education is probably the most pressing of urban problems. A lower rate of population growth would immeasurably help the situation – but itself partly depends on the spread of education. Family planning programmes will certainly help, but must go along with renewed efforts to bring education to the urban masses.

Pathways to the future

The world is on a path from which there is no return, transforming it into a predominately urban planet. By the time population stabilizes at the end of next century, truly rural populations will have become a very small minority. With the advances in communications which can be expected, today’s widely separated cities will have become neighbourhoods in the world-wide metropolis. Airports will be stations on an urban network, linking points within the global city.

Most of the urban population lives in developing countries. The proportion will increase: the rate at which it is growing is unsurpassed in human history. Also beyond previous experience are the emerging “megacities” of the developing countries. World history offers no guide to handling the potential of these giants for progress - or disaster.

As previously discussed, the transformation from a rural to an urban planet offers both great blessings and heavy burdens. The transition from agrarian to urban has always been considered a positive step, part of the process of modernization. However, the rapid growth of urban populations in societies rapidly changing in other ways is fraught with enormous tension and tremendously complex problems.

Keys to understanding

There are four keys to understanding the nature of cities and the urbanization process:

- Urban life is essential to the social nature of the modem world. A well-run city offers economies of scale - in many developing countries, for example, the predominance of one very large city is an advantage, especially in the first phase of urban expansion;
• The concept of urban and rural population should not lead us to think of them as opposites, the interests of which are diametrically opposed. Social research has shown a kaleidoscope of rural-urban contacts among family members, friends and acquaintances, with infinite variations;

• Cities are part of the nation, and policies intended for them may have consequences far beyond their boundaries. In the other direction, national policies will affect the cities, whether they are intended to do so or not;

• The great cities of the world, with their urban and rural hinterlands, interact with each other, exchanging populations as well as trade. Many migrants to West European cities, for example, come from large cities or rural areas dominated by a city. Developing countries are among the hosts to migrants: many of the migrants in the cities of the Arabian peninsula moved from other Asian countries and from Egypt (Findlay, 1985).

Eliminating bias

Any policy which touches upon urban dynamics must be carefully scanned for traces of bias, whether urban or anti-urban. Urban bias was discussed previously; anti-urban bias exists but is seldom recognized as such. Its manifestations have ranged from completely irrational attempts to exterminate urban professionals and eliminate cities by force to recommendations of neglect so as to discourage migration.

Human values

Central to the concern for human values is a deep respect for the individual’s autonomy, integration in society and right to a minimum level of comfort and protection.

In practice it is not always possible to promote all values equally, thus forcing the consideration of trade-offs and compromises. An example is the issue of freedom of residence and movement.

Participation

Those who will be most affected should have a hand in developing and executing urban policy. This calls for mechanisms to secure the participation of the urban masses in decision-making – but it also calls for some protection for rural populations which are more dispersed and therefore wield less influence than urban groups. Without denying the need for planning, there is a danger of
creating huge bureaucracies and vested interests more intent on maintaining the status quo than on emancipating the urban masses.

This skepticism towards unlimited planning questions the belief that urban problems can be solved through free-spending “social” policies, which merely guarantee infantile dependence. Instead, the emphasis should be on the creation of environments where, within the network of job, family and friends, city-dwellers can make their own decisions for an ecaromicahy and socially enriched urban life.

All planning, and all assistance, should promote self-reliance rather than dependence and the burden of gratitude.

Charting the course

Using these guidelights, it is possible to sketch two paths to the urban future. One concentrates on demographic trends, specifically growth. The other is a group of policies for the welfare of urban populations. At many points the two paths will cross and intertwine.

Policies for the security and well-being of the urban population can be discussed only briefly. They include solutions to urban problems for which rapid population growth is partially responsible. Four observations are in order. One: the argument that social policies increase the attraction of the cities cannot justify infringing on the basic human rights of urban inhabitants. A minimum standard of social and economic wellbeing should be vigourously pursued. Two: to counter the attraction of the cities, everything should be done to balance urban policy with concern for rural well-being. Three: policies of social improvement should be seen as contributions to lower fertility. Four: slower population growth will make it much easier to attain these objectives.

Policies to influence population growth have been schematically presented on page 19. The options are to reduce migration, to reduce fertility, or a combination of both. Migration policies have not been able to stem the tide of rapid urban population growth. They are so expensive that they have rarely been extended beyond token efforts. Closing the city to would-be immigrants has been tried in Manila and Jakarta without much success. In China, the difficulties placed in the way of changing personal registration from rural to urban have undoubtedly reduced the flow. The efficiency of the Chinese system of strict registration combined with an urban rationing system has impressed some observers, but there are costs., The restrictive migration policies were responsible for increasing rural-urban income differences (Perkins, 1984) and left the burden of dealing with rapid population growth to the rural areas themselves rather than shifting it to the urban authorities. Furthermore, the dis-
couraging of urban migration helped to perpetuate some negative aspects of the old social system (Johnson, 1984).

Indirect policies to affect migration towards large cities have also been unsuccessful. Elimination of urban bias in all its forms and removal of subsidies from urban infrastructure and services should have an impact on migration. However, the impact is not easy to measure and may also conflict with concern for the well-being of the urban population and national development objectives.

### Policies to influence urban population growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies to influence migration</th>
<th>Direct intervention</th>
<th>Indirect intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In urban areas</td>
<td>I Transfer of urban population to rural and other areas</td>
<td>I Elimination of urban bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II Reversing the flow</td>
<td>II Realistic costing of urban infrastructure and service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III Closing the city</td>
<td>III Decentralization and promotion of middle-sized and smaller cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IV Growth pole strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In rural areas</td>
<td>I Severe restriction on rural outmigration</td>
<td>I Provision of better services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II Encouragement of migration to other than metropolitan areas</td>
<td>II Rural development programme</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>III Promotion of non-agricultural employment in rural areas</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Policies to influence fertility</th>
<th>Direct intervention</th>
<th>Indirect intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In urban areas</td>
<td>I Promotion of family planning including special programmes for migrants</td>
<td>I Promotion of content favourable to family planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II Use of migrants to promote family planning in rural areas</td>
<td>II Improvement of women’s status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>III Reduction of infant and child mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In rural areas</td>
<td>I Promotion of family planning including special programmes geared to potential migrants</td>
<td>I Reduction of risk environment so that children lose their function as instruments to cope with the rural risk environment (through, for example, land reform, and rural public works.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More active forms of influence on migration patterns have been far less successful. Decentralization has frequently been uneconomical or wasteful. Growth pole strategies, in which cities are the targets of policies intended to benefit an entire region have also been disappointing in spite of heavy investment. Rural policies such as promotion of non-agricultural employment may be among the most important (Jones, 1983).

These limitations and problems make policies to reduce fertility more attractive. National family planning programmes normally deal with both urban and rural populations and can draw on wide experience in both. However, few of them have a reduction of urban population growth as an explicit objective; this should be a first step.

A practical programme of this kind might include encouraging rural family planning workers to identify likely migrants - families who might have the entrepreneurial spirit and commitment to the planning of their lives to seek a better life in the city. Once in the city these migrants maintain close ties with family and friends in rural areas and often form the bridge for new ideas and lifestyles to reach the rural areas. With the guidance of the rural programme, family planning might be among the new ideas. Special attention should also be paid to areas of circular migration.

The wider context should also encourage smaller families. Small families and family planning are more easily accepted in the city – though some reasons for this, such as severe housing shortage, are socially negative.

Paradoxically, improving housing above the minimum level of slums and squatter settlements, like improving health and reducing infant mortality and providing education, may help in the long run to reduce family size. It is part of the wider context of optimism in which having fewer children may be seen to be advantageous for the whole family.

Urban environments often encourage improvement in women’s status. Beyond the reach of the traditional family system and with opportunities for employment, women can carve their independent niches.

Education usually is more accessible in the cities and is seen to help children to make their way in the world. The desire for their children to get ahead, especially strong among some urban immigrants, can be a powerful stimulus for family planning. Education for the parents, even the spread of literacy among the urban poor, is normally expected to increase knowledge of and interest in family planning.

Health programmes for the urban poor, besides the direct benefits, can be expected to have some influence on fertility. Healthier mothers have healthier
children – and, it appears, fewer of them. If the same pattern of education, family planning and mother and child health care can be established in the rural as in the urban areas, along with other inducements towards smaller families (Cam, 1981) this will help to reduce pressure towards migration. Here too migrants could be enlisted in building bridges between urban and rural areas.

**UNFPA and the urban future**

UNFPA has helped to draw attention to the problems of rapid urban population growth and has pursued many of the ideas mentioned in this report. Rome in 1980 was the site of an international conference on population and the urban future. The “Rome Declaration” and recommendations of the conference drew attention to the role of rapid population growth in urban problems. It recommended a strategy with three important components:

- The formulation of comprehensive national population policies;
- Policies for balanced development; and
- Policies for improvement of urban areas.

The need for decentralization and the development of smaller cities was also spotlighted. The need to adapt and reinforce measures enabling couples to decide freely on the number of children and on the length of the interval between births was specifically emphasized. Family planning education and the creation of family planning services were strongly recommended along with recommendations for urban housing, transportation, employment and education.

UNFPA continues to have a strong interest in urbanization and especially population factors. It is promoting two conferences on urban population problems this year.

A regional conference on small and medium cities of Latin America and the Caribbean was held in Mexico in February 1986. The International Conference on Population and the Urban Future will be held at Barcelona from 19 to 22 May 1986. It will focus on cities expected to have populations exceeding 4 million by the end of the century. Mayors of all these cities have been invited to attend, along with local, national and international planners and administrators.

The International Conference on Population in Mexico in 1984 also drew attention to the problems of population distribution and internal migration. The Mexico conference emphasized the need for sound spatial socio-economic policies while maintaining the right of movement for migrants.
In its search for solutions to problems of urban population dynamics UNFPA puts continuous emphasis on three fundamental objectives—economic efficiency, social equity and population balance. It recognizes that the solution to many urban problems will only come about through economic efficiency and vast growth of productive forces. Economic growth is essential to any solution of urban problems. At the same time social equity should be pursued, with emphasis on equal opportunity for all.

Neither economic efficiency nor social equity can be attained without demographic balance—balance within and between urban and rural areas, balanced population distribution and balanced population growth.

References


The Cultural Context of Thailand’s Fertility Decline*

The recent course of fertility decline in Thailand becomes far more comprehensible once the cultural setting is taken into account.

By John Knodel, Aphichat Chamratrithirong and Nibhon Debavalya

Thailand is among a growing number of developing countries that are experiencing a sustained decline in fertility from former high and relatively stable levels. In the case of Thailand, the reduction in birth rates has been both rapid and pervasive. During the last two decades, the total fertility rate (TFR) fell from a level of between 6 and 7 births per woman to a level of close to 3 per woman. According to a recent United Nations assessment, Thailand’s fertility decline during the last two decades ranks as the third largest, behind only China and the Republic of Korea, among the 15 most populous developing countries of the world (United Nations, 1985).

* This copyright article is adapted (with the publisher’s permission) from a chapter in a forthcoming monograph by the authors entitled Thailand’s Reproductive Revolution: Rapid Fertility Decline in a Third World Setting to be published in 1987 by the University of Wisconsin Press. John Knodel is Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan - Ann Arbor; Aphichat Chamratrithirong, Assistant Director of the Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Bangkok; and Nibhon Debavalya was the Director of the Institute of Population Studies, Chulalongkom University, at the time this research was conducted. The authors would like to acknowledge with gratitude the collaborative efforts of Napaporn Havanon and Anthony Pramulrathana in research on which parts of this article are based. The research was supported by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Population Council’s International Research Awards Program on the Determinants of Fertility.
This decline in fertility is primarily attributable to reduced reproductive rates among married couples, with a rising age at marriage contributing only modestly to the change. The decline in fertility was accompanied by a massive increase in the practice of modern methods of birth control. In 1984, the contraceptive prevalence rate among married women in the reproductive ages 15 to 44 was 65 per cent, a level not far below the levels prevailing in economically developed countries.

Thailand’s fertility decline is especially notable because it has been occurring while the country is still predominantly rural and agricultural. Particularly striking is the pervasive nature of the recent reproductive change. A preference for small size families, increased contraceptive prevalence and declining fertility currently characterize almost all major segments of Thai society. Today, recently married couples – whether they be rural or urban, lesser or better educated - overwhelmingly express a desire for only modest sized families as illustrated clearly in table 1. Nationally, well over half of recently married women have indicated two children as their preferred number and only one in ten women expressed a wish for more than three children (Kamnuansilpa and Chamratrithirong, 1985). Given that deliberate birth control is now widely practised, such recently married couples will be in a position to keep their actual childbearing in accord with their expressed wishes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of education</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fewer than 4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1984 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey

The one readily identifiable group that has lagged behind in terms of the changing reproductive patterns is the small Muslim minority, many of whom live in southern Thailand where, to a lesser extent, fertility decline has also lagged among Buddhists. However, since Muslims constitute only a very small
An adequate explanation of the timing, pace and extent of Thailand’s fertility decline involves a number of major components. These include the rapid and fundamental social changes that have been taking place which have caused couples increasingly to view large numbers of children as an economic burden, as well as the organized efforts to provide modern contraceptive methods, especially through the Government’s family planning programme. In Thailand, as in other societies, the impact of social and economic change and government programmes on actual behaviour is mediated through the cultural setting. While the features which make up that setting are not static and are themselves affected by social and economic change, cultural dimensions are likely to show considerable continuity and persistence even when social and economic change is rapid, as it is in Thailand. Thus it is possible to discuss various aspects of Thai culture in terms of the extent to which they predispose or inhibit reproductive change, at least over shorter spans of time.

The goal of the following analysis is to explore several important dimensions of Thai culture that seem particularly relevant to understanding the rapid change in reproductive behaviour that has been taking place. We draw on both quantitative and qualitative data sources, including ethnographic studies, sample surveys and a series of directed “focus group discussions” conducted primarily among the rural population. We occasionally draw quotations from these group discussions to illustrate our argument. The analysis is not intended to be a comprehensive explanation of Thailand’s fertility decline, but rather to illustrate how incomplete such an explanation would be if the cultural setting were ignored. The major thesis is that the ready limitation of family size and the adoption of birth control by Thai couples as ways to adjust to changing socio-economic circumstances have been facilitated by several important features of Thai culture. These include the notable absence of several pro-natalist cultural props to high fertility and barriers to fertility decline characteristic of many third world societies. The analysis starts with a consideration of parent repayment expectations, a cultural dimension often thought to prevent family size reduction. Three other crucial cultural features, i.e. the locus of reproductive decision making, the extent of female autonomy and the influence of Theravada Buddhism, are then discussed. As evi-

1/ There is some evidence indicating that the fertility of several other groups, also of minor demographic importance such as the populations living in the most remote areas of the north-eastern region and hill-tribes in the north-west, was falling more slowly than the rest of the population (ESCAP, 1985).

2/ For a description of these focus group discussions and their results, see Knodel et al, 1984.
dence of the importance of cultural influences on fertility decline in Thailand, attention is drawn to the contrasting reproductive attitudes and behaviour of Buddhists and Muslims.

Persistence of parent repayment

The expectation that children, when they become economically active adults, will provide comfort and support for their parents, particularly when the parents are too old to work or care for themselves, is shared by all segments of Thai society. Indeed, it is a common expectation in virtually all third world countries and often cited as a major incentive for high fertility. The general lack of effective government and private pension systems providing more than very limited coverage in Thailand and most of the developing world ensures that the majority of couples will look to family members, and particularly their children, for support in their later years.

In Thailand, this support takes both economic and social forms and is viewed as repayment to parents for having borne, cared for and raised the child (Rabibhadana, 1984; Phillips, 1965: 158-9). It is a tradition deeply rooted in the secular and religious culture and firmly linked to the broad normative structure. Temporary service in the Buddhist monkhood by sons, a common occurrence in Thai society, is seen as part of this repayment since it confers merit on the parents as well as the son. As part of a traditional rite frequently performed prior to ordination, explicit reference is made to the obligation that a son has to repay his parents, thus ordination is seen as part of this process. In elementary school, a commonly read excerpt from a classical text deals with the strong obligation a child has to repay his parents for their care. Moreover, helping to support parents and providing them comfort is also viewed as a way a person can accumulate merit, thus conferring a religious significance on a tradition that is firmly rooted in the secular culture (Podhisita, 1985:38-39).

Parent repayment in Thailand is a process that begins when children are old enough to be useful and continues through the child’s adult years as long as the parents live. Indeed, even after parents die, children are expected to pay respects to the deceased parents. It encompasses the help young children

3/ “Merit” (boon) refers to the Thai belief derived from the Hindu-Buddhist doctrine of karma that all one’s good conduct earns spiritual credit (merit) and brings positive rewards; one’s evil conduct results in spiritual demerit and yields negative rewards both in the present life and in subsequent incarnations (Pfanner and Ingersoll, 1962:352-353; Suebsonti, 1980:159). Throughout their lives, individuals maintain a relative store of merit which represents the accumulated balance between merit and demerit (Kirsch, 1977: 246).

4/ We are grateful to Fern and Jasper Ingersoll for calling our attention to these points.
provide parents but it is the later stage of the process, when parents are no longer able to work or care for their own needs, that is seen as the essence of parent repayment. The discussion of repayment to parents, therefore, focuses on contributions made during the children’s adult years.

Focus group discussion participants of both the older and younger generations agreed that parents expect and are entitled to support from their adult children as repayment for, or as an obligation created by, the care parents provided children during infancy and childhood. The discussions made clear that repayment encompassed both economic and non-economic dimensions. Contributions of money, material goods and labour assistance to the parents’ economic activities were cited as well as social and moral support.

The most frequently mentioned expectation was assistance during illness, primarily in the form of physical care and psychological comfort, but also financial help in purchasing medicine and paying for medical services. Children are also expected to be responsible for arranging and paying for funeral ceremonies, often a significant expense in Thailand, and for “making religious merit” on behalf of deceased parents. Other common examples included the provision of food and clothes, donations of money on a regular or irregular basis, social visits, help around the house and help with cooking. The form of repayment is seen as varying with the stage in the parents’, as well as in the adult children’s, life cycles, balancing need and ability. Parents anticipate a reduction in monetary and material contributions once adult children start to raise families of their own.

Discussions during the focus group sessions made clear that the expectation of help and support is perceived as a fundamental reason in Thailand for having children. Both the older and younger generations view children, at least ideally, as a form of security and comfort in old age.

“If my children don’t come [to look after me] when I am old, I don’t know why I had children.” (Younger woman, North-east)

“I hope for everything from my children but I don’t know if they will do it all for us... to help us in work, get money for us, help the family, things like this.” (Younger man, North-east)

“When we are sick, when we are old, we expect our children to cook and get food for us, to get water for us. We are not strong enough to fetch water, so we want to depend on them. If we do not have any strength to work, have no money, we will depend on them.” (Older woman, central region)

Although there seemed to be nearly universal agreement that it is important for children to help to support and comfort parents in old age, there
was some recognition that it does not always work out that way. Several participants stressed the need for at least several children in case some turn out not to be dependable. While expectation of old-age support from children clearly persists, it is difficult to assess whether the extent of support has changed, in part because the form of support appears to be shifting. Many focus group participants observed that monetary remittances from wage labour or non-agricultural jobs outside the village are replacing help in activities requiring labour. Thus parent repayment is becoming monetized along with other aspects of villagers’ lives. Both older and younger generations appear to be aware of this change. While some see it as an improvement and even as an increase in the extent of support provided to parents by adult children, this viewpoint is not universal.

The monetization of support is tied in with many changes that are occurring in Thai society. The increasing scarcity of farm land and the greater rewards of wage earning jobs mean more children seek their livelihood away from home. It is often difficult to leave a job elsewhere to return to the home village when labour is needed, such as during planting or harvesting time, although this still occurs with some frequency. Older parents are faced with the same monetization of daily life as everyone else but may have greater difficulty earning cash incomes of their own. Hence the shift from labour assistance to cash remittances may be convenient for parents and children. Moreover, many elderly parents probably have access to both forms of support, since often some children remain home or near the village while their siblings have non-agricultural jobs elsewhere.

"Back then [children] helped with labour. Now they help with expenses."  
(Older Buddhist man, South)

"The kind of help which children give to their parents has changed from working in the rice field to sending things or money to their parents because the children always work outside the village."

(Older Muslim woman, South)

"Those who stay at home help us to cook. Those who are far away send us money."

(Older woman, North)

"It’s changed for the better. They make money for us, that’s better. Before there was no place to earn money. Today there are lots of places. In the past children only helped growing rice. . . [Today] they grow rice and make money for us. [Before] I didn’t know where to go. After the rice growing season, we stayed at home. Now after growing rice, they go to earn some money. It’s better than before."

(Older woman, North-east)
Survey data on expectations and hopes for help from children during the parents’ older years are available from several sources. A substantial amount of information was collected in a 1975 survey based on interviews with married men. In response to open-ended questions on the advantages of a large family and disadvantages of small families, Thai husbands showed considerable interest in the help that children provide when the parents are old or when the parents become ill. This was true for both rural and urban men (Arnold and Pejaranonda, 1977). Husbands were also asked what means of support they expected in old age and to what extent they expected to rely on their children. Three-fourths of all husbands spontaneously mentioned children as a means of old age support. This was a far larger percentage than for any of the other possible means. For example, only 39 per cent spontaneously mentioned savings, the second most commonly mentioned means (Arnold and Pejaranonda, 1977).

When asked specific questions about help expected from children (as shown in table 2), 88 per cent thought that during their older years they would depend at least in part for economic assistance from children. By contrast, only 28 per cent expected a great deal of financial support. Rural men are somewhat more likely to indicate reliance on children for such support than their urban counterparts. The substantial degree of economic and emotional reliance on children in the later years is evident from the finding that 85 per cent of rural husbands and 77 per cent of urban husbands said that they expected to live with their children during old age.

As indicated above, expectations of repayment to parents generally extend over most of the productive life of children. Adult children with a job are often expected to contribute income to the family, especially if those children are unmarried. This is evident from the survey responses of married men to questions about their expectation of receiving income from unmarried and married adult children. The questions asked referred to adult children in general and not to the respondent’s own children. The results indicate that most husbands, both in rural and urban areas, expect parents to receive income from adult children, but primarily from unmarried children. Rural husbands especially appear to feel that once their children are married, the burden of caring for their own families will prevent them from sending income to their parents. Among the subset of husbands who had children who actually earned money, the large majority (77 per cent) of unmarried children contributed income at least occasionally compared with slightly less than one third of married children (Arnold and Pejaranonda, 1977). Thus expectations appear to conform well to the actual pattern.

Data from a 1979 survey also confirm high levels of expectation of support from children when parents are old. Respondents with children were
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Attitudes towards assistance from children during old age, by residence and age cohort.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of married men in 1975 who expect:</td>
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<tr>
<td>To rely on any financial support from children when old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of responses to question: “Can you rely on your children to take care of you in your old age?” (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever married women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Sum of categories may differ slightly from 100 owing to rounding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 1979 results include a small number who did not know their age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: The 1975 data are from the Survey of Fertility in Thailand; the 1979 data are from the National Survey of Family Planning Practices, Fertility and Mortality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
asked if they thought they could rely on their children for support in old age. The wording of the question referred to support of any kind, not necessarily financial support. Results are also shown in table 2 and indicate that the large majority of rural household heads, most of whom were male, and rural ever married women thought that they could rely on their children for support in old age. Most of the rest said that they were not sure and only a modest proportion of either group indicated that they believed they could not rely on their children for support. Although expectations of support were lower for urban respondents, still about two thirds of urban household heads and urban ever married women thought that they could rely on their children in old age. Again, most of the remainder were uncertain.

While the focus group discussion results indicate that expectations of parent repayment are widespread among both older and younger generation participants, they cannot serve as the basis for judging in any precise manner either the extent to which such expectations have been changing over time or if generational differences exist. The quantitative data from surveys also make clear that expectations of support of parents by adult children are very prevalent. Unfortunately, however, there is a lack of series of comparable data from different surveys to permit a direct assessment of trends. Although not directly a measure of change, age group comparisons of attitudes towards support in old age from a single survey can at least indicate if there are cohort differences at a given time. For this reason, the findings in table 2 are also shown according to the age group of the respondent.

Results from both surveys indicate modest age cohort differences in some attitudes towards assistance from children during old age and almost no difference in others. To the extent that differences are evident, they generally indicate that expectations were more prevalent among the older cohorts. For example, according to the results from the 1975 survey, there is almost no difference in the percentage of married men under 30 and those over 50 who expect to rely on at least some financial support from children during old age. For all age groups, such expectations are very prevalent. Expectations to live with children during old age are also very prevalent among younger men. However, a higher percentage of the older men expect a great deal of support compared with the younger men. There was also a somewhat higher proportion of older than younger men who expect unmarried and married children to give part of their income to parents. Since the questions about giving part of the income to parents did not refer specifically to old age support, the fact that there were greater cohort differences in the responses to these questions than to those which referred to old age may reflect that the latter are more resistant to change, possibly because they represent the essence of parent repayment.
Responses based on the 1979 survey about reliance on children for assistance in old age indicate a slight increase in the proportion in successive age cohorts who think they can rely on children. This is entirely a result of a decrease in the proportion of the older cohorts who are uncertain about assistance, however, rather than a decrease in those who say that they do not think they can rely on their children. Possibly the age cohort differences in the percentage who are uncertain about assistance reflects the fact that the older respondents are already at an age when they would be receiving such assistance. Thus there is little uncertainty in their situation. In contrast, for the younger respondents, such assistance is still a considerable distance into the future.

In brief, cultural expectations of parent repayment have remained strong during a period when rapid reproductive change has taken place. This suggests the ability of deeply entrenched cultural features to persist in the face of rapid social and economic change supporting the view expressed by Freedman (1979) that abandonment of traditional familial values is not necessarily a prior condition for large-scale adoption of contraception and a substantial reduction of fertility.

Given the persistence of the parent repayment norm and the continuing anticipation of dependence on children for support in old age by older and younger generations alike, we were particularly interested in how focus group discussion participants reconciled this with the younger generation’s desire for a smaller number of children. Old and young participants alike were evenly divided as to whether or not having few children threatened security in old age.

The most common view was that a trade-off is involved between maximizing the economic security and psychological comfort to be gained in old age by having many children and minimizing the economic hardships and burdens of child rearing by keeping family size small. Parents today opt for small families because they judge that the additional benefits to be gained later in life from many children are not worth the hardships that raising a large family would involve. Some simply feel there is in fact no choice to be made, since under current social and economic circumstances they could not possibly afford raising many children.

“I want many children after they have grown up. But right now I want only a few because I have no time to raise them.”
(Younger Muslim woman, South)

“In principle, having a lot of children will make you comfortable when you are old, but when they are young it will be difficult to find the money to raise them.”
(Younger man, North)
“When children have grown up, the one who has many is more comfortable than the one who has few. But if the children are still small, the one with many children will not be as comfortable as the one with few.”

(Older man, North-east)

Nevertheless, a number of focus group participants believed that the only persons whom one can truly depend upon are one’s own children and that a couple with few children runs the risk that there might not be anyone around to help later in life. There were also a number of participants who expressed uncertainty about whether children can truly be depended upon in old age. Lauro (1979:111 noted a similar uncertainty among the central Thai villagers he studied. This uncertainty may mitigate to some extent the sense of conflict felt between reduced family size and a need for many children later in life.

One view among participants who did not feel that having few children jeopardized old-age support was that support in later years does not depend on the number of children but rather on their upbringing. A small number, if properly raised, would still be sufficient to provide parents with security. Given the norm that only one child, typically the youngest daughter, will reside permanently with the parents and hence carry the bulk of the burden of responsibility for parental care, a single child should be sufficient to be reasonably assured of support in old age (Lauro, 1977).

There were also participants who believed that the relationship between the number of children and economic support later in life has changed and that a simple association between more children and greater economic security in old age no longer holds in today’s changing social and economic environment. They felt that fewer but better educated children would be more favourably situated to obtain desirable non-agricultural jobs and thus would be better able to provide economic support to their parents, especially in terms of cash remittances. Since the cost of providing an adequate education for many children would be prohibitive, the economic prospects of children and parents are improved by limiting family size to a few children.

“[Support in old age] depends on how you raise and bring up your children. To have a small number of children, but to raise them well, is better than to have many children, but not to raise them well.”

(Younger Muslim man, South)

“[Parents will still be supported well] because education has progressed. Now children get a higher education. Repayment of parents will go according to the level of education. Before, not too many studied, but for those who got a high education, they repaid their parents well.
The needs and expectations of parents with two or three children will be greater but the children will receive more care. Two children with education can repay parents better than 10 [without]. ”

(Older man, North-east)

“[Children should study a lot.] That’s good. They’ll be able to find jobs. We’ll be able to rely on them. There will be a future for them.”

(Older woman, North)

“I think it is important [to have children take care of you when you are old]. That’s why now I try to send my children to school. I expect that in the future I will depend on them.”

(Younger man, central region)

In brief, both the focus group discussions and survey data clearly indicate that younger couples still have strong expectations that their children will support them during their later adult years despite the fact that they wish to have only a few children. While many see having few children as conflicting with maximizing support in old age, other considerations favouring small families override these concerns. Others see no conflict since they believe that few children are sufficient for support. Some even argue that couples with small families will be better off since they will be better able to educate their children and, given the societal changes underway, more highly educated children will be in a more advantageous economic situation to provide the parent repayment expected.

Locus of reproductive decision making

Discussions of high fertility in some third world societies have recently emphasized the importance of the influence of kin, particularly the couple’s parents, on reproductive decisions of the couple. Such influence is typically pro-natal, in accordance with the kin group’s own interest and serves as an important prop supporting high fertility (e.g., Caldwell, 1982: 117-118). In Thailand, however, this is clearly not the case. Decisions with respect to the establishment of a conjugal unit, and hence the initiation of reproduction, as well as decisions concerning the number of children to have are generally defined as being primarily the responsibility of the couple themselves.

In Thailand, both the choice of spouse and timing of marriage are largely decisions for the individual couple themselves. Participants in the focus group discussions emphasized maturity and responsibility as important prerequisites for marriage. At the same time, however, they also indicated that ultimately the timing of marriage depends on the individuals themselves.
“They can get married at whatever age they want to.”
(Younger woman, North)

“Some say it’s good but some say it’s bad to marry when you are young. It really depends on the individual.”
(Younger man, North-east)

"At 20 years (it is good to get married). At that age they can take good responsibility for a family. But then, it depends on the individual."
(Older Buddhist man, South)

Questions about who makes decisions concerning mate selection were not discussed in the focus group sessions. But there is a considerable body of sociological and anthropological literature indicating that for some time the norm has been that individuals have freedom to select their own mate. Arranged marriages, among the Buddhist majority at least, are relatively rare, although they may have been more common in the past. Parents or other kin play mainly an advisory role (Limanonda, 1983; Henderson, 1971:69). As Lauro (1979:270-2) points out, despite the formal structure of some marriage arrangements involving negotiations over bride price and ceremonial visits between respective households, in actual practice the decision to marry is a prior one made almost completely by the marriage partners themselves. While bride payment is common, it does not signify corporate family involvement in the marriage contract and the payment is not returned in the case of divorce as is common in societies emphasizing an extended family structure. In addition, there is little family involvement in cases where couples decide to divorce. Essentially marriage and divorce are matters for the couple itself to decide. Other family members have minimal influence.

Survey data on attitudes towards mate selection, presented in table 3, are available from rural samples covering the decade 1969 to 1979. These data confirm the predominant view that sons and daughters should exercise considerable freedom in their choice of a spouse. Consultation between parents and children is expected, but only a small proportion of respondents felt that the parents should select a child’s spouse. No significant shift in attitudes towards this aspect of family life among rural Thai women is evident during a decade when substantial social change, including a major transformation of reproductive behaviour, was taking place. This probably reflects the fact that the pre-existing pattern already favoured the mode of mate selection towards which social and economic development are usually assumed to lead. It is interesting that at the time of the 1969 survey there was little difference in attitudes between rural and urban women concerning mate selection.

Childbearing decisions in Thailand are also generally defined as being primarily the responsibility of the couple themselves. Focus group discussion
Table 3: Attitudes towards mate selection, among ever married women, 1969-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who chooses mate</th>
<th>For son</th>
<th>For daughter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents must choose</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child chooses on own</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child chooses with parental approval</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents choose with child’s approval</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per cent</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>2,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1969 and 1970 results are from the Longitudinal Study of Social, Economic and Demographic Change; the 1979 results are from the National Survey of Family Planning Practices, Fertility and Mortality.

Participants of both older and younger generations were largely in agreement on this matter. When asked whether they sought advice from anyone about how many children to have, younger participants rarely mentioned parents. They either stressed that the marriage partners themselves decide or they mentioned the advice of friends and siblings. Moreover, when they discussed such matters with others, they were simply seeking informal advice and were not being given imperatives from persons with deeply felt vested interests. The older generation also rarely mentioned discussing reproductive matters with their own parents. When asked whether they had advised their children on such matters, many older respondents indicated they had not.

The advice that was given typically encouraged the practice of contraception and advocated few children, primarily for the couple’s own benefit. Occasionally older generation participants indicated small families for their children were also in their (the grandparents’) interest since they themselves might have to help to ease the burden of raising many children. The two generations agreed that whatever advice is offered, ultimately it is for the couple itself to decide whether or not to follow it.

“The husband and wife consult only each other. Nobody else should have an opinion. Other people don’t help raise the children.”

(Younger woman, North-east)
“‘I never discussed [how many children to have] with my children. They never asked me for my advice. I never give advice.’”

“‘I told my children that to have two is enough.’”

(Two older women, Bangkok construction site)

“It’s not related to anyone else. The husband and wife decide together.”

(Older man, North-east)

“We don’t talk with anyone else. . . . We wouldn’t listen to what other people advise. We listen to ourselves.”

(Younger woman, North)

‘[I advised them] not to have many children because not only they but we will also be in difficulty.’

(Older man, North-east)

The focus group results in this respect are quite consistent with findings reported from a nationwide rural survey conducted in 1975. The vast majority interviewed (91 per cent of husbands and 79 per cent of wives) indicated they had not received advice from other family members about the number of children to have. Among the few who did receive advice, a third of the men and almost half of the women said they did not follow it (Deemar, 1975).

The relative independence of couples in decisions about marriage and subsequent childbearing is consistent with a general and pervading theme in the Thai value system (discussed below in connection with the influence of religion), stressing individual responsibility for one’s own actions and destiny. Thus, even though many couples spend an initial period of married life co-resident with the parents of one of the marriage partners, the parents would still be likely to define their appropriate influence on such decisions as minimal. Moreover, independent decision-making for the younger couple fits in with the prevailing expectation that each conjugal unit will be largely responsible for the support of its own children. Even during the co-residential initial period following marriage, the younger couple may contribute more to the upkeep of the household than does the older couple (Yoddumnem, 1983). This is in considerable contrast with the situation thought to typify many developing countries whereby shared resources associated with co-residence in a joint household free the younger couple from the direct economic responsibility of rearing children and permit an earlier start to childbearing than would be the case if they had to depend primarily on their own resources alone (Davis, 1955).

The absence of strong parental and kin pressure to have large families means that a prop considered important for the continuance of high fertility in many other societies is absent in Thailand. Moreover, the relative economic independence from an extended family grouping makes Thai couples parti-
cularly sensitive to socio-economic changes that lead to increased costs of raising a family. Since reproductive decisions are considered to be almost entirely the responsibility of couples themselves, they are free to adjust their fertility to fit their own perceived interests, thus facilitating rapid reproductive change.

Female autonomy

Another important feature of the Thai cultural setting that facilitates rapid fertility decline is the relatively favourable status of Thai women. They compare well with women in many parts of the third world in several important respects affecting female status. For example, literacy among women currently in the reproductive ages is close to universal and labour force participation rates are high (Curtin, 1982; Meesook, 1980; Debaulya, 1983). Relations between husband and wife are also relatively egalitarian (Hanks and Hanks, 1963; Henderson, 1971:69).

Several features of Thai culture and social structure support, reflect and enhance the position of women in Thailand. There is not a strong gender preference for sons as there is in many other societies. Families in rural areas are traditionally centred around female members. Even though authority rests with the senior male, it is usually passed through the female line, especially in the North and North-east. Ideally, property is shared equally among sons and daughters, but the family home is typically allotted to the one who takes care of the parents in old age, customarily the youngest daughter. The post-nuptial residence pattern emphasizing co-residence with the bride’s parents means that at marriage the man joins the ritual, economic and social group of his wife. Men and women are expected to contribute to the household’s productive activities without a sharp dividing line between the tasks that men and women carry out. Within the family, the wife has considerable power and typically controls family finances (Phongpaichit, 1982; Mougue, 1984; Bunnag, 1971:7; Henderson, 1971:72-73; Muecke, 1984). According to Lauro (1979:273), while major family economic decisions were likely to involve consultation between husband and wife in the village he studied, often the wife had the greater say. The importance of women in trading is a related feature of women’s economic roles (Mougue, 1984).

It is often pointed out that Theravada Buddhism in theory ascribes an inferior status to women (Thitsa, 1980; Aneckvanich, 1979). Ordination into the monkhood is reserved for men; moreover, monks are forbidden any physical contact with women. However, this prohibition is not necessarily a sign of female inferiority, but rather a reflection of a fear that female sexuality may distract monks from their spiritual path. It is by no means clear that Buddhist culture in practice relegates women to a religiously inferior status.
relative to men (Keyes, 1984). Women are more frequent contributors of food and other items of daily charity to monks than are men and hence their moral prestige is high (Henderson, 1971:70).

Of particular relevance for reproductive behaviour is the high degree of female autonomy, i.e. the ability to manipulate one’s personal environment, that characterizes Thai culture, extending into the area of decisions regarding reproductive behaviour. There is considerable agreement that Thai women act more independently in many spheres than women in most other third world societies.

The focus group discussions make clear that Thai women nowadays believe that they have considerable influence over reproductive decisions. Participants were asked their opinions about whether the husband or wife should decide about the use of birth control as well as who had the ultimate say in deciding on the number of children to have. The most common opinion expressed was that reproductive decisions were the joint responsibility of husband and wife.

“You must discuss [the number of children] between husband and wife.”
(Younger Muslim man, South)

“We have to decide [the number of children] together.”
(Younger man, North)

“There has to be a consensus. We must first ask the child’s mother whether to control or not in order to see how willing she is.”
(Younger man, central region)

“Both sides should be satisfied, the husband and the wife. . . [the number of children] can usually be agreed upon.”
(Younger man, North-east)

When participants did not stress the joint nature of reproductive decisions, they often indicated that they themselves had the dominant influence or ultimate say. Men usually held that the husband, as head of the household and the primary provider for the family, should be the one who ultimately determines such matters. In contrast, women stressed that wives had more at stake, in as much as they experience the pain of giving birth and most of the burden of child-rearing.

5/ When discussing influences on reproductive behaviour, it is useful to distinguish to concept of autonomy, which refers to the ability to manipulate one’s personal environment, from the broader and more diffuse concepts of female status and social position, since female autonomy is of more direct relevance (Dyson and Moore, 1983).
“The man [should be the one to decide on birth control] because the man is the one who supports the family and everything depends on him.”

(Younger man, North-east)

“[The wife decides on the number of children because] after we give birth, we are responsible for housework, raising children. The men... are always away from the house... We are at home with all this work and difficulty. We have to raise the children and the buffaloes as well.”

(Younger woman, North-east)

“We decide [on family planning] ourselves. Our husbands don’t know anything about it. We don’t ask them... We are women. We have to protect ourselves first... If we want two, we’ll have two. I cannot have three as my husband wishes. He does not carry the child. He does not give birth with us.”

‘I consulted with my husband by telling him two are enough. (He said) nothing. If I want two, he gets two.”

(Two younger women, North)

“We decide [on family planning] ourselves. Our husbands don’t know anything about it. We don’t ask them... We are women. We have to protect ourselves first... If we want two, we’ll have two. I cannot have three as my husband wishes. He does not carry the child. He does not give birth with us.”

(Older woman, Bangkok construction site)

Clearly, Thai women commonly take an active part in deciding on reproductive goals and in implementing them through their decision to practise birth control.

Perhaps most significantly, the vast majority of Thai couples currently practising contraception rely on female methods and thus in a very real sense contraception is under the woman’s direct control.

A number of surveys in Thailand have included questions about family decision making (e.g. National Council of Women, 1977; Siripirom, 1982). In general, they yield results consistent with the impressions provided by the anthropological literature: many decisions tend to be made jointly.

With respect specifically to reproductive decisions, survey results are largely consistent with the findings based on the focus group discussions. The most common opinion, among male and female respondents, is that both spouses should decide on such matters together. Among those who do not indicate that reproductive decisions should be jointly made, men are more likely to emphasize the husband’s role and women the wife’s role. In a large scale survey of the rural population in 1975, respondents were asked whose responsibility it was to plan the number of children and to practise birth control.
Of those with an opinion, the majority of both sexes (56 per cent of men and 58 per cent of women) felt it was the responsibility of both husband and wife. Most of the rest felt that it was the responsibility of the spouse of their own sex (Deemar, 1975). In contrast, the majority of men and women with an opinion (57 and 79 per cent respectively) agreed that contraception was the women’s responsibility.

The relative autonomy of Thai women not only means that women have an important say in matters related to childbearing but also that women as well as men are exposed to the societal forces that encourage smaller family sizes. Women currently receive almost the same amount of education as men and are likely to participate in the labour force, including jobs outside the home in the case of urban women. Perhaps of particular importance is the relatively free access of women to rapidly expanding communications and transportation networks. As documented by several surveys, there are only modest differences between rural men and women in the frequency with which they visit towns and are exposed to the mass media.

**Religion and related cultural values**

Much of the dominant Thai value system and its associated behavioural patterns derive from Theravada Buddhism, the religion of the vast majority of Thais. The teachings of this school of Buddhism are absorbed from early childhood and major precepts are recited in primary school. Many Thai males, especially those from rural areas, spend a short period (typically three months) serving as Buddhist monks during early adulthood, thus reinforcing the concepts and behaviour patterns associated with Buddhism (Mole, 1973). The only other religion in Thailand with any substantial number of followers is Islam. Muslims represent only 4 per cent of the Thai population (compared with 95 per cent who are Buddhists) and thus do not have a large national demographic influence. Nevertheless, because of the considerable differences between the two religious groups in reproductive attitudes and behaviour (Kamnuansilpa and Chamratrithirong, 1985), a comparison of the extent and nature of influence that religion has on such matters is instructive and helps to underscore the importance of Buddhism and associated cultural values in facilitating Thailand’s fertility decline.

In some societies, implicit or explicit pro-natalism or proscriptions on birth control are part of the predominant religious ideology or associated folk beliefs and can serve as a powerful cultural barrier to reducing fertility. This by and large is not the case in Thailand.

Thai Buddhism not only poses no major barriers to the use of contraception or to reduced family size but in some respects facilitates them. There
are no scriptural prohibitions against contraception nor is Buddhist doctrine particularly pro-natalist. Only abortion is opposed on religious grounds based on the Buddhist proscription against taking life (Ling, 1969; Fagley, 1967: 79). Unlike Buddhism, Islam tends to exert pro-natalist pressures on couples and discourages the use of specific methods of birth control. Although scholars of Islam hold differing views about whether Islam explicitly encourages people to have large families, many observers agree that institutional pressures related to Islam, such as the Islamic conception of women’s roles and its implication for the status of women, exert pro-natalist influences. Moreover, religious authorities strongly oppose abortion and sterilization, although temporary methods of contraception, particularly withdrawal, are not generally opposed (Nagi, 1983; Fagley, 1967:81).

Buddhism holds that religious matters and worldly matters should be separated. Birth control is clearly considered a worldly matter (Suebsonti, 1980). In sharp contrast, the religion of Islam is an all-pervasive system making little distinction between the sacred and the secular (Sadik, 1985).

One of the major topics for investigation in a recent survey was religious attitudes towards marital fertility control and contraceptive methods. The results, summarized in table 4, indicate pronounced differences in the attitudes of the two religious groups. Because most Muslims live either in the South or in Bangkok and the surrounding central region, separate results are shown for each.

Among women who reported never using contraception, two thirds of the Muslims mentioned religious objections as a reason for non-use compared with only 13 per cent of the Buddhists. This ‘difference is all the more impressive given that almost half of the Muslim women had never used a contraceptive method compared with only one in eight Buddhist women. Opposition to spacing and limiting births among married women in general is quite low for Buddhists. Although more Muslims than Buddhists oppose birth spacing, Muslims show far more tolerance of spacing children than they do of limiting family size. Only about a third of the Muslims indicated that they thought spacing was contrary to Islam while four fifths thought limiting family size was contrary. Attitudes towards specific contraceptive methods are consistent with this general view of spacing and limiting. Again, only a small minority of Buddhist women expressed religious opposition to the methods shown in the table. Muslims were more likely to object to all three of the methods, but opposition was far less to withdrawal and the pill (both temporary methods that could be used for spacing) than to female sterilization (a permanent method).

A full analysis of the difference in Buddhist and Muslim reproductive
Table 4: Religious attitudes regarding fertility control, by religion, among currently married women aged 15-49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Buddhists</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole country</td>
<td>South Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent citing religious reasons for non-use of contraceptives among those who never used</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent believing the following is against their religion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate spacing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting family size</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent who believe specific method is against their religion⁷</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pill</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ⁷ Limited to women who said they were familiar with the specific method.
attitudes and behaviour in Thailand would need to involve consideration of a variety of issues beyond the scope of the present discussion. Of particular concern would be the extent to which the minority status of Thai Muslims affects reproductive patterns independently of or in interaction with religion. Moreover, the position of Thai Muslim women, and probably South-east Asian Muslim women generally, is considerably more favourable than women in most other Muslim societies. For example, Thai Muslim women play a significant and probably dominant role in the household economy, managing family finances in much the same way as Thai Buddhist women (Prachuabmoh, 1985). In addition, married Muslim women, although not single women, are quite active in trading and thus appear frequently in public markets. This is quite contrary to the practice of secluding women, common in South Asian and Middle Eastern Muslim societies. Nevertheless, Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists maintain fundamentally distinctive cultural identities stemming from their different religions and reinforced by their different historical heritage, different clothing and, in much of the South, by different languages (Prachuabmoh, 1983; Suthasasana, 1985). Although some of the differences in reproductive attitudes and behaviour may be attributable to differing socio-economic circumstances, the conclusion that much of the contrast is due to cultural differences associated with religion seems inescapable. In particular, Thai Buddhism is considerably more conducive than Thai Islam to the practice of contraception and the limitation of family size as a way to adjust to the pressures created by the on-going process of socio-economic change currently taking place in Thailand.

In several indirect but important ways, Buddhism as practiced in Thailand may facilitate rapid reproductive change as a response to a changing socio-economic environment. Values and behaviour reflecting individualism and freedom of action are common in Thai culture and can be traced to Buddhism which stresses the role of the individual in seeking spiritual liberation and generally emphasizes the primacy of individual action and responsibility (Lauro, 1979; Mole, 1973: 65-68; Phillips, 1967: 363-364). A variety of Buddhist teachings point to the need of individual effort to achieve desired goals.

The attainment of *nirvana* (freedom from the suffering incurred in the recurrent cycle of birth, death and rebirth), the ultimate goal of Buddhism, is to be brought about through each person’s individual efforts. Moreover, the amount of effort required differs for each individual according to the balance of merit and demerit accumulated during the present and past lives. In addition, the precepts offered to help an individual along the way to *nirvana* are viewed as guidelines to be followed according to the individual’s wishes rather than as rigid rules (Mole, 1973: 34).

A frequently repeated secular saying, although not a derivative from Buddhism but consistent with the emphasis on individualism, is that “to do
as one pleases, is to be genuinely Thai” (Podhisita, 1985:82-3). This sense that individuals are largely responsible for their own fate and that they should follow their own wishes is quite consistent with the concept that couples should limit their family size in their own interest. Combined with the lack of proscriptions on contraceptive practices in Buddhism, this emphasis on individualism provides a normative context permissive of rapid reproductive change. The Buddhist emphasis on individual responsibility is in sharp contrast with the emphasis in Islam on the importance of God’s will in determining an individual’s fate.

Buddhist ideology, as popularly perceived, may also be seen as contributing to the general flexibility and tolerance often associated with Thai culture. Interference with the affairs of others in most circumstances is thought inappropriate (Mizuno, 1978; Mole, 1973: 66-67; Lauro, 1979). Remaining calm (“cool-hearted”) and indifferent in situations which might provoke social condemnation or intervention elsewhere is a prevalent value (Podhisita, 1985). In this respect, Buddhist culture contributes to the relative ease with which modern tastes, attitudes and behaviour, including changing reproductive patterns, can be adopted with minimal social pressures surfacing against these changes.

Other aspects of the Thai cultural setting which may have facilitated the decline in fertility are more difficult to specify. The fact that pragmatism and expediency are prized values within Thai culture is no doubt relevant and fits the general view of Thais showing considerable flexibility in their behaviour (Wijeyewardene, G. 1967;83;Mole, 1973: 83-84; Rosenfield et al, 1982). One anthropologist has noted that Thais have an unusual ability to imitate and thus to adapt themselves readily to alien cultural influences from the West or Japan (Bunnag, 1971:20). In a study of the maintenance of ethnic boundaries focusing on Thai Muslims, another anthropologist contrasts Islam and Buddhism as practised in Thailand. She points out that unlike Islam, Buddhism does not provide the sources of ethnic identity nor the mechanisms for maintaining sharp ethnic boundaries to any substantial extent. Thus Buddhism has little influence on regulating interaction with outsiders (Prachuabmoh, 1980:267). This is not to deny that Thais have a strong sense of ethnic identity and clear views as to what constitutes being a Thai. Still, the net result appears to be a relative openness on the part of Thais to the diffusion of ideas and practices initially exogenous to Thai culture, provided they are seen as meeting an individual’s perceived needs. Such a characterization is consistent with the rapid adoption of modern means of contraception as well as the rapid acceptance of and aspirations for modern consumer goods. It also helps to explain the speed at which the small family norm has taken hold.

The preceding analysis has focused on the ways in which Thai culture
has influenced reproductive behaviour and attitudes. The recent course of fertility decline in Thailand becomes far more comprehensible once the cultural setting in which it has occurred is taken into account. All too often, analyses of fertility change concentrate primarily on the dynamic influences of social and economic change or organized interventions to spread fertility control in the search for explanation. Typically, only lip service is paid to the particular mixture of cultural features that in important ways can serve to facilitate or inhibit their impact. We hope that this analysis has helped to redress the balance and that the role of cultural influences on reproduction will continue to gain the attention it deserves.

References


Integrating Population and Development Planning*

A review of the ASEAN Population Programme’s potential contribution to the integration of population and development planning

By Alejandro N. Herrin, Henry Pardoko Tan Boon Ann and Chira Hongladarom

Calls for the integration of population and development planning have been made at various forums during the last decade. At the international level, a call was incorporated within the 1974 World Population Plan of Action which states: “Population measures and programmes should be integrated into comprehensive social and economic plans and programmes . . . “ It essentially remained in force in the 1984 Mexico City Declaration on Population and Development.

At the regional level, it is contained in the 1982 Asian and Pacific Call for Action on Population and Development which states: “An integrated approach should be evolved and followed in regard to population and related programmes of economic and social development.”

* The authors of this paper are A. N. Herrin, the Regional Project Co-ordinator and Project Director for the Philippines, and the Project Directors for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Population Programme Phase III Project: Integration of Population and Development.
Underlying these calls is the recognition that population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them. Also, it is recognized that population goals and policies are integral parts of social, economic and cultural development aimed at improving standards of living and the quality of life of the people.

The repeated calls for integration that have been made for over a decade reflect the fact that probably not much actual integration has taken place. Although there have been serious attempts at integration, still it appears that progress has been unusually slow. The apparent lack of progress towards integration is probably due to a lack of clarity about the concept of integrating population and development planning, or when the concept is clear, development planners and population programme managers may not be very confident as to how to proceed with integration.

A common suggestion found in various documents calling for integration is to create a high-level population unit within a Government’s development planning agency to be responsible for integrating population policies and programmes with related social and economic development policies and programmes. Just exactly what such a unit is expected to do in operational terms to promote the desired integration has not been clearly spelled out.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to clarify the meaning of “integration of population and development planning” and to examine how the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Population Programme, through various activities, can contribute to the task of integration.*

Integration: Its meaning and application to various planning perspectives

Concept of integration

A review of the documents that call for the integration of population and development planning reveals varying concepts and perspectives associated with the term “integration”. This has led to more confusion than clarification among development planners and population programme managers. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the concept of integration at least from the standpoint of population and development planning as a basis for its effective implementation.

* Discussion of the meaning of integration is based on a longer paper by Herrin (1984), the main outlines of which were deliberated upon in October 1984 by the country directors of the ASEAN Population Programme Phase III Project: Integration of Population and Development.
In development planning, development goals and objectives are considered and policies and programmes designed to achieve those goals and objectives are formulated. In formulating policies and programmes, certain assumptions are made about the behaviour of the real world. If the objectives are narrowly specified, then the model can be very simple. For example, if the objective of economic development is narrowly specified as simply an increase in the growth of GNP, then assumptions about the behaviour of the real world can be reflected in simple growth models that relate economic growth to the rate of capital accumulation. Policies can then be formulated to speed up the rate of capital accumulation. Likewise, if the population objective is merely to reduce population growth rates through fertility control, then a model can be designed that simply relates fertility reduction to the use of modern contraception. Policies and programmes can then be formulated to increase the practice of family planning.

During the past three decades, however, the conceptualization of economic development and population problems has undergone significant change, leading to a more comprehensive specification of development goals and objectives. As a result, the formulation of policies and programmes must be based on a more comprehensive conceptualization of the behaviour of the real world, one that takes into account various socio-economic and demographic interrelationships. Thus, in very simple terms, "integration" refers to the explicit consideration of socio-economic and demographic interrelationships in the formulation of development policies and programmes to achieve a country's development goals and objectives.

Macro planning perspective

Three elements comprise the concept of integration as shown in figure 1: namely, the development objectives, the behavioural model, and the development policies and programmes. Development goals expressed in the development plan often include a) sustained economic growth; b) total human development, which subsumes such concerns as employment, education, health etc.; and c) equitable distribution of the fruits of development, which includes equitable distribution at the levels of spatial and population subgroups.

While development goals may be stated in broad terms, development objectives must be specified in more concrete terms. With the integration concept described above, development objectives must be specified ultimately in terms of both socio-economic and demographic outcomes. Thus, for example, the interest may be in increasing employment to influence not merely an aggregate statistic, but one that is specified in terms of the employment of subgroups of the population: age-sex composition, occupational distribution, sectoral distribution (agriculture, industry and services) and spatial distribu-
Figure 1: Framework for viewing the integration of population and development planning at the macro level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development policies</th>
<th>Behavioural model</th>
<th>Development objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic policies (X)</td>
<td>DO → EP</td>
<td>Desired socio-economic-demographic outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic policies (Y)</td>
<td>DP ← EO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DO = demographic outcomes  
DP = demographic processes  
EP = socio-economic processes  
EO = socio-economic outcomes

This suggests the need for more refined and disaggregated socio-economic development indicators so that the success of the policies for achieving the newly specified development objectives can be judged.

The question of equity is readily addressed by this integration concept because the specification of the development objectives is in the form of "who gets what". Thus, the objective of equity, which has dominated development thinking in past decades, can now be properly pursued not in isolation, but as an integral part of the entire development planning process.

The second element is the behavioural model which serves as the framework for viewing socio-economic and demographic interrelations at the macro level. This set of interrelationships may be described in a very general way...
with the aid of figure 2. The interrelationships may be traced by starting with the demographic processes of fertility, mortality and migration determining the demographic outcomes in terms of size, age-sex structure and spatial distribution of the population. The resulting demographic characteristics in turn affect the operation of socio-economic processes which include savings and investments, land and labour utilization, consumption of goods and services, public expenditures, and international trade and finance. The operation of socio-economic processes then determine the socio-economic outcomes in terms of output/income, employment, educational and health status, environmental quality etc. The socio-economic outcomes in turn affect the basic demographic processes that we started with.

The basis for identifying these various interrelationships is the growing theoretical and empirical literature on population-development interactions. Suffice it to say that our basic understanding of population-development interrelationships may be expected to sharpen as new information from the sciences regarding these broad interrelationships continues to become available.

An important implication that arises from the integrated approach is that planning must necessarily be pursued with a longer term horizon than is currently the case, i.e., short/medium term planning through five-year development plans. The need to take a longer view of the development process is necessary in order to fully account for critical socio-economic-demographic interrelationships which may require a long time to become evident. As past development experience suggests, a series of short/medium term plans that simply take demographic factors as exogenous will one day show that these demographic factors are seriously constraining socio-economic development efforts and reducing policy options.

The planning approach that is suggested by this integrated approach is one in which a long-term perspective plan is first formulated that takes full account of socio-economic-demographic interrelationships, and then formulates short/medium term plans consistent with this overall long-term perspective. Short/medium term gains could then be properly assessed in terms of their long-term impact on the achievement of development objectives.

The third element of this integration concept is the set of development policies consisting broadly of socio-economic policies and demographic policies. Demographic policies affect primarily demographic processes, while economic policies affect primarily economic processes. Both processes jointly affect development outcomes. It follows then that demographic and economic policies must be formulated in a comprehensive, as opposed to isolated, manner to produce the desired development outcomes. It is now clear, more than ever after decades of experience with development planning, that either of the
policies pursued in isolation will have a smaller chance of significantly achieving in the long run a country’s development objectives. Well known historical examples might serve to illustrate the point.

On the basis of hindsight, we note that the policies and programmes to reduce mortality in the early post-war years, while successful in the short run, nevertheless resulted in rapid population growth in the decades that followed. This made it difficult for socio-economic processes to adjust adequately to the new demographic realities, thus making the early gains in mortality reduction difficult to sustain in the more recent periods. Similarly, economic policies
pursued in the early post-war years to increase the pace of industrialization, without explicit consideration of their long-term demographic consequences, have led to a pattern of economic growth characterized by a highly uneven spatial distribution of economic activities. The results were a disproportionate concentration of population in one or a few major urban centres and regional income inequalities, among others.

**Sectoral planning perspective**

The concept of integration can be readily applied to sectoral planning, i.e. the planning which addresses specific sectoral concerns such as employment, education and health. In this regard, what is needed is a more specific formulation of the sectoral objectives and correspondingly, a more detailed specification of socio-economic-demographic interrelationships as they relate to the determination of the specific sectoral outcomes.

As an example, consider employment, examining a more detailed behavioural model derived from the previously described general macro model. The determination of employment by size, age-sex composition and spatial distribution can be described with the aid of figure 3, in which the demographic blocks have been collapsed into a single block called “Demographic factors”, and the socio-economic blocks into “Socio-economic factors”. For each of these broad blocks, specific elements are supplied that are critical in the determination of employment. A major determinant of labour supply is the size, age-sex structure and spatial distribution of the working age population. Nonetheless, labour supply is also determined by the age-sex specific activity rates which in turn depend on demographic (e.g. fertility) and socio-economic factors, e.g. levels of household income, educational attainment and health status. Since males normally tend to exhibit uniformly high rates of labour force participation over a broad age range, a dynamic element in labour supply is the participation of females. All things being equal, labour supply can expand rapidly if more women decide to participate in the labour force. Declining fertility which may moderate the size of the working age population after a time lag may not proportionately reduce labour supply if declining fertility also leads to a higher labour force participation of women.

As for labour demand, a whole range of economic policies affecting the level, structural (agriculture vs. industry) and spatial (rural vs. urban) pattern of investment, as well as the choice of technology (labour-biased vs. capital-biased) influence the level and distribution of labour demand. Economic policies that have the long-term effect of limiting the growth of employment demand to only a few sectors and areas in the face of the rapid growth of the working age population will obviously exacerbate problems of unemployment and underemployment in other sectors and areas. Likewise, demogra-
Figure 3: Simplified framework for analyzing the socio-economic and demographic determinants of employment

Demographic factors

- Size, age-sex composition and spatial distribution of working age

Socio-economic factors

- Income
  - Education
  - Health/nutrition
- Level, and sectoral and spatial pattern of investment
  - Technology

- Age-sex specific activity rates

Labour supply

- (size, age-sex composition and spatial distribution)

Labour demand

- (level, age-sex composition and spatial distribution)

Employment

- (level, age-sex composition and spatial distribution)
phic policies that have the effect of reducing the growth of the population of working ages in the intermediate run may not adequately solve the employment problem in the face of the increasing participation of women resulting from fertility decline in the current period, and in the face of slow growth of employment opportunities generated by inappropriate economic policies. The need to synchronize demographic and economic policies with regard to employment objectives, therefore, becomes evident.

Programme/project planning perspective

It might be instructive to examine how the concept of integration can be applied at the programme or project planning level. The integration of population and development planning at the programme and project level requires consideration of the same three basic elements mentioned previously in connection with macro or sectoral planning: namely, the development objectives, the population-development interactions, and the socio-economic and demographic-related programmes designed to achieve those objectives. The objectives of any programme/project form a subset of the overall development objectives, and these are specified to address a particular subgroup of the population on which the programme/project is expected to have an impact. In designing programmes to achieve certain objectives, certain assumptions are made as to the behaviour of the target population, i.e. households or individuals. This framework makes it possible to analyze the impact of the programmes on the target population. Integration then implies that economic and demographic interrelationships be taken into account at the household or individual level in the formulation and design of programmes to achieve desired behavioural outcomes.

A simple framework for viewing socio-economic and demographic interactions at the household or individual level is depicted in figure 4. This framework may be described in terms of four basic components: namely, a) a model of household or individual decision-making, b) the physical, social and economic environment of the community, c) autonomous changes in this environment, and d) changes in the environment arising from population and development activities.

In this framework, the household or other micro unit, in an attempt to improve its welfare, is assumed to make various types of decisions based on a set of opportunities and constraints defined by its household resources (physical and human capital as well as by the size, and age-sex composition of its members) and by the community environment. This environment includes the community’s natural resource endowments; the prevailing structure of markets and prices for factors of production and products; and the prevailing social structure and social organization which define, for example, land
Figure 4. Simplified framework for analyzing the impact of population and development activities on household behaviour.

- Agricultural and natural resource base
- Structure of markets and prices for factors and products
- Household decisions
- Physical resources and human capital
- Saving/consumption
- Migration
- Physical and social-economic infrastructure
- Social structure and organization
- Household size and age-sex composition
- Education programmes, other exogenous factors
- Physical resources and human capital
- Saving/consumption
- Migration
- Physical and social-economic infrastructure
- Social structure and organization
- Household size and age-sex composition
- Education programmes, other exogenous factors
tenure status, crop sharing arrangements, patterns of family and non-family labour utilization, and social, economic and political alliances which influence co-operative behaviour and community participation. Autonomous changes in the community environment include changes in international prices for agricultural export crops, national trends in the prices of inputs and outputs, technology changes etc. The final source of change in the environment is the set of population and development programmes. These include a) provision of the physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation, flood control and electrification; b) the provision of social infrastructure and services in the field of education, health, nutrition, environmental sanitation and family planning; c) agricultural programmes such as land reform, development of co-operatives, provision of extension services and credit and of various input subsidies and price supports; and d) industrial development programmes involving the provision of credit and various subsidies to small and large-scale enterprises.

In this framework, demographic and socio-economic development programmes are expected to affect the structure of opportunities and constraints facing the households either directly by increasing household resources and access to basic economic and social services, or indirectly through the community, by increasing community resources available to the households. The households are then expected to respond to these changes in a manner they perceive will improve their present economic and social welfare. Depending upon the nature of the emerging structure of opportunities and constraints, a "multiphasic response" may be expected from those households in terms of decisions regarding saving/consumption, investment in physical and human capital, labour participation of its members, fertility and migration.

An important feature of this simple framework is the recognition that individual or household decisions on any particular aspect of welfare are not independent of other decisions in the sense that these decisions are all jointly determined by individual, household and community-level factors that can be influenced by various types of development activities.

The implication of this feature for programme planning is that programmes formulated to achieve a small subset of development objectives may not achieve such objectives if formulated in isolation. For example, programmes to increase agricultural production through the provision of irrigation facilities may not lead to significant increases in household net incomes if prices of complementary agricultural inputs are kept high and prices of outputs are kept low directly or indirectly as a result of policies and programmes to support modern industry (i.e. policies to keep urban prices of foodstuffs low in order to support a low wage policy in industry, or import controls and tariffs to protect local manufacturing industries producing agricultural inputs). Furthermore, infrastructure programmes in education, health and electrification
Figure 5: A simple framework for analyzing the impact of development programmes on fertility behaviour

- Development programmes
  - education
  - health
  - agriculture
  - industry
  - infrastructure
  - family planning
  - etc.

- Motivation for fertility
- Cost of fertility control

- Demand for children
- Infant/child mortality
- Number of children
- Fertility
may fail to achieve their immediate objectives if account is not taken of low household incomes that tend to limit effective access to such programmes.

Finally, family planning programmes may not achieve more than moderate success in situations where the economic value of children is high as a result of limited opportunities for current income generation and old age support. This does not imply that any particular development programme must be designed to be all-encompassing of the various factors identified; this surely would not be feasible and it is not necessary for achieving integration. Rather, what the framework implies is that given the interrelationships among various household and community determinants of behaviour, the planner can design various programmes with the view that their combined and complementary impacts all lead to the desired behavioural outcomes.

To illustrate this last point, it might be helpful to consider the impacts of development programmes and projects on fertility behaviour. Without going into detail, one can conceptualize the determinants of fertility behaviour as shown in figure 5. Individual, household and community characteristics determine the demand for and number of (surviving) children. In the case of demand, these characteristics include income and the desire for children relative to other goods, the latter being determined by community norms, and household and individual background characteristics. An increase in income generally makes the household wealthier and able to afford to buy more goods and to support more children. However, increased income may also increase the opportunity cost of children, or lower the relative cost of alternative investment opportunities to support future consumption streams and the old age security of parents. Both factors will tend to reduce the demand for children. Furthermore, higher income will tend to improve health and nutrition, and therefore, reduce infant/child mortality, thus leading to lower demand for births for a given level of desired number of surviving children. Better education and health and higher income could also improve maternal health, nutrition and prenatal care, leading to a higher potential number of births. Lower infant/child mortality results in a larger number of surviving children. The motivation for fertility control arises if the potential number of children exceed the desired number. Actual fertility is then determined by the degree to which perfect fertility control is achieved so that the desired and the potential number of children are equated. This degree of fertility control depends on the cost (psychic as well as monetary) of contraception which is determined in turn by individual, household and community characteristics that increase effective knowledge of and access to contraceptive techniques.

Development programmes affect fertility indirectly through their effect on the determinants of supply and demand for children and on the cost of contraception. A family planning programme may directly affect tastes for
children through IEC (information, education and communication) campaigns, and the cost of contraception by providing better services at low cost. Health programmes can affect infant and child mortality as well as the health of mothers, thus affecting the demand for and number of children. Programmes that succeed in increasing income and employment opportunities for women will tend to reduce the demand for children etc.

In all these examples, it may be seen that various programmes, while pursued independently in the administrative sense, can have impacts on fertility. What is needed from an integrated standpoint, however, is to see that each programme is having the desired impact on individual, household and community variables that contribute to fertility change. As a result of the evaluation, it may be decided to strengthen some programmes or modify others. In any case, an integrated approach does not mean establishing a new set of programmes to deal with all the determinants of fertility; many development programmes were already in place long before government family planning programmes came into being.

A family planning programme need not be tied to an existing development programme; it can be administratively implemented independently of other programmes without compromising the concept of integration. Likewise, a family planning programme need not adopt “entry points” to be acceptable to the potential target population; a whole range of programmes is already being implemented in the community. It can be brought to the attention of potential clientele that the family planning programme is yet another community undertaking to improve the people’s standard of living and quality of life. The entire information strategy of the family planning programme could point to development programmes already in place in order to improve motivational efforts.

The ASEAN Population Programme

In 1976, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord which was issued by five ASEAN heads of government called for, among others, the “intensification and expansion of existing co-operation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region...”. Responding to this call, the ASEAN heads of population programmes and ASEAN experts convened in that year to review each country’s population programme, identify common areas for collaborative activity and develop a framework for the ASEAN Population Programme. Since then significant progress has been made in implementing collaborative projects in the broad areas of human resource development, information and communication, and research and policy studies. Table 1 lists the projects under each of these broad areas. A total of 19 projects have been implemented since 1976, seven of which are currently in progress under Phase III.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components/projects</th>
<th>Main thrusts/objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Human resource development</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Development of Modular Training Programme in Population and Rural Development <em>(Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand)</em> (TRAINING I)</td>
<td>To firm up the integration of national population and development activities through a) the production of a core of master trainers in ASEAN countries to train trainers of population and development agencies, and b) the strengthening of the training capabilities of population and development agencies by adopting and applying extension methods and techniques in their training strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase II</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Institutional Development and Exchange of Personnel <em>(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand)</em> (INST DEV II)</td>
<td>To strengthen the institutional capability of population and related agencies in planning and programme management through the exchange of personnel, research and research seminars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ASEAN Women in Development <em>(Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand)</em> (WOMEN I)</td>
<td>To strengthen the role of women in socio-economic activities with emphasis on their welfare through projects designed to a) facilitate the functions of implementing agencies in mobilizing available resources and in motivating women to participate in activities that would lead to self-improvement, family welfare and achievement of demographic goals, and b) to train women in income-generating skills, provide a market for their products and help form self-reliant groups that will ensure the continuity of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components/projects</td>
<td>Main thrusts/objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase III</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. ASEAN Training for Population and Development <em>(Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand)</em> <em>(TRAINING III)</em></td>
<td>To develop and utilize a modular training package to train trainers who in turn will train “community influencers” at the grass-roots level on the determinants of programme development at the community level, taking into account the social, cultural and environmental factors in the initiation and development of community oriented integrated population-development projects within the broad framework of national policies and plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Contribution of Youth and Women in Population and Development <em>(Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand)</em> <em>(WOMEN III)</em></td>
<td>To promote the welfare of women and youth in the context of self-reliance through the establishment of service centres which will provide training in income-generating activities, population and family education etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Information and communication</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase I</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Multi-media Support for the ASEAN Population Programme in the Context of Development <em>(Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand)</em> <em>(POPIN I)</em></td>
<td>To provide more adequate and systematic multi-media support for the communication component of population programmes in the context of existing integrated agricultural development programmes of the predominantly rural ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, and of the urban development programme of Singapore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components/projects</th>
<th>Main thrusts/objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Seminar on the Utilization of Research Findings in Population Policy Formulation</td>
<td>To increase awareness among ASEAN countries of ways to improve research utilization for policy formulation and programme planning and implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Programme Management <em>(Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand)</em> (RESUTIL I)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase II</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Developing/Strengthening National Population Information Networks in ASEAN</td>
<td>To contribute to more effective implementation of national family planning and population policies and programmes in ASEAN through improved flow of information between population policy-makers and planners, programme implementors, researchers and academics etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries <em>(ASEAN POPIN) (Philippines), (POPIN II)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase III</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ASEAN POPIN and Multi-media Support for Development *(Philippines, Indonesia,</td>
<td>To strengthen the documentation and networking functions of the national POPIN networks through provision of advanced training, conduct of monitoring and evaluation activities, production of materials and computerization of the data base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia and Thailand) (POPIN III)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Research and policy studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Integration of Population and Rural Development Policies and Programmes <em>(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) (POPDEV I)</em></td>
<td>To provide better information on and enhance the understanding among policy-makers and planners of the interrelationship between population and development, and to identify specific aspects of development that can be strengthened in order to help to achieve specific demographic goals in the context of the overall development strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components/projects</td>
<td>Main thrusts/objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Migration in Relation to Rural Development (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) (MIGDEV I)</td>
<td>To examine the relationship between migration and development through a study of the effects of rural resettlement programmes on migration and vice-versa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase II**

1. Population-Development and Man/Resource Balance (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) (POPDEV II)

2. Population Migratory Movement and Development (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) (MIGDEV II)

3. Development of ASEAN Social Indicators (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) (INDICATORS II)

4. Studies in Health and Family Planning (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) (HEALTH II)

To provide analytical information on population-development interrelationships as an input into the integration of population and development planning; specifically to prepare macro analytical country reports on population and development dynamics and to review and synthesize micro level data dealing with the socio-economic and demographic responses of households to population pressure and poverty.

To promote the integration of population distribution concerns into national development policies through research on the relationship between population movement and development and through an action programme that will collect information and provide advisory services to migrants and potential migrants in urban and rural areas.

To review and assess current experiences in ASEAN regarding the development of social indicators and their application to development planning and policy.

To provide information on a) health and family planning in ASEAN specifically with respect to population, health and family planning interrelationships,
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components/projects</th>
<th>Main thrusts/objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Integration of Population and Development (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) (POPDEV III)</td>
<td>To provide analytical information on population-development interrelationships required for policy formulation and planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population Mobility and Urbanization (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) (MIGDEV III)</td>
<td>To examine the relationships between population mobility, urbanization and development in ASEAN and to strengthen existing technical co-operation in the field of population redistribution and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morbidity and Mortality Differentials (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) (MORATALITY III)</td>
<td>To provide timely and reliable estimates of morbidity and mortality levels and trends by geographical area and socio-economic strata in ASEAN and to examine the determinants of such levels and trends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Socio-economic Consequences of the Aging of the Population (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) (AGING III)</td>
<td>To determine the implications of the aging of population in terms of labour force, employment, health and other social needs; identify current problems facing the elderly in various environmental settings; and review/evaluate existing policies and programmes on employment, social security and health care for the elderly in the context of general development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential contribution to integration

A framework for assessing the potential contribution of the ASEAN Population Programme to the integration of population and development planning is shown in Table 2. The potential contribution of ASEAN projects can be examined under three main headings corresponding to the three major elements in the previously described integration process. These are a) a sharpening of the conceptualization of population-development interrelationships in the context of the ASEAN experience, b) a fuller specification of development objectives and c) improving the process of policy formulation and programme implementation to achieve the development objectives. In view of the close interrelationships among these different types of contributions, one could expect that a particular ASEAN project could contribute

Table 2: Framework for assessing the potential contribution of the ASEAN Population Programme to the integration of population and development planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/progmmme</th>
<th>Population-development model</th>
<th>Development objectives</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formulation</strong></td>
<td>Improved process of policy formulation through a better flow of information</td>
<td>Sharpening of conceptualization of population-development interrelationships at the macro and micro levels through synthesis of existing information and through innovative research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Improved implementation through increased capability of trainers of frontline workers and community leaders in programme design and implementation, through analysis and evaluation of existing programmes and through testing of innovative programmes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the planning process in more than one way. The following examples illustrate the potential contribution of ASEAN projects to the integration process.

Research and policy studies. Projects under this broad category may be expected to contribute to the integration process mainly by sharpening conceptualization of critical socio-economic and demographic interactions in the ASEAN setting. This contribution arises from a) the synthesis of existing information regarding such interrelationships in the ASEAN setting (e.g. POPDEV II and MIGDEV III) and b) the generation of new information on population-development interrelationships through innovative research studies (e.g. studies on the socio-economic and demographic impact of development projects under POPDEV I and POPDEV III, studies on the interrelationships between population movement, urbanization and development under MIGDEV I – III, studies on the implications of changing age structures under AGING III, studies on the determinants of morbidity and mortality under MORTALITY III, and studies on nuptiality and international migration under INST DEV II).

Not only can these research and policy studies sharpen our conceptualization of population-development interrelationships, but they can also raise issues and reveal potential new directions for policy and programme design. Thus, these studies can also provide the bases for improving the specification of development objectives to take account of socio-economic and demographic aspects of welfare on the one hand, and provide insights into possible policy reformulation and programme redesign, on the other hand. For example, the POPDEV II micro component study examined socio-economic and demographic profiles of specific population subgroups characterized by a high prevalence of poverty. Such information is useful for mapping out the location and characteristics of poverty groups requiring more intensive public interventions. The expected result would be a more refined specification of development objectives, one that clearly specifies the target populations rather than simply the target problems. In another vein, the studies on the demographic impact of development programmes conducted by POPDEV I, that are to be followed up by POPDEV III, highlight the fact that socioeconomic programmes designed primarily to achieve non-demographic objectives can have significant demographic impacts as well. This information is expected to lead to a fuller accounting of costs and benefits of programmes, and, therefore, to more unbiased criteria for judging the relative merits of alternative programmes. The ultimate result is an improved prospect for greater efficiency in resource allocation. Furthermore, such studies, in discovering specific programme elements that figure prominently in the production of outcomes (or lack of an outcome) of a programme, can provide a basis for decisions.
regarding which programme elements need to be strengthened, modified or reduced in scope in order to make the programme more effective in achieving specific development objectives.

Human resource development. Projects under this category may be expected to contribute to the integration process mainly through their contribution to improved implementation of population-development programmes. This contribution can be expected to arise from a) efforts to upgrade the training capability of population programme personnel to train frontline workers and influential people in the community in the formulation and implementation of population-development programmes at the community level (e.g. TRAINING I, III), b) efforts to exchange ideas and experiences among ASEAN population programme personnel (e.g. INST DEV II) and c) efforts to develop and test innovative programmes to enhance the welfare of women (e.g. WOMEN II, III). The collective experiences derived from these activities may be expected to assist programme impact evaluators in determining whether the failure of some programmes to produce intended outcomes is due:

- to inadequate conceptualization of the problem (e.g. failure to fully account for social, cultural, environmental and demographic factors in the design of programmes), or
- to the failure to mobilize all available community resources, or
- to the failure to implement supportive measures to maximize the impact of the programme (e.g. failure to develop a market for products in an income-generating programme), or
- to the inherent ineffectiveness of the programme itself.

As a result of such new information, development programmes in the future may be designed and implemented in such a way that the prospects for the successful achievement of their desired development objectives are enhanced.

Information and communication. Projects under this category may be expected to contribute to the integration process by providing an efficient information network essential for sound policy/programme formulation and implementation. At the policy level, such projects provide a mechanism for a more efficient flow of information from researchers and field workers to policy-makers and programme managers (e.g. POPIN I - III and RESUTIL I). In addition, projects such as POPIN I and III which attempt to provide communication support for development programmes can be expected to enhance the proper implementation and eventual success of such programmes.
Steps towards integration and possible future ASEAN collaborative activities

Another way of looking at the potential contribution of the ASEAN Population Programme is to specify the steps needed to make integration a reality, and then examine how the ASEAN Population Programme has contributed so far to the realization of such steps. In the process, such a review will help to identify gaps and, therefore, help to form the basis for future ASEAN collaborative activities aimed at closing those gaps. Several concrete steps such as the following might be taken to implement the integration process.

First, if the integration of population and development planning refers to the explicit consideration of population-development interrelationships in the formulation of policies and programmes, then it follows that the first necessary step in the integration process is for planners to gain confidence in their ability to analyze population-development interrelationships and to begin to use such information, even at first qualitatively, in the formulation of policies and programmes. Some amount of useful integration could already be achieved at this point. Among the population-development interrelationships that might fruitfully be considered as starting points are those related to migration and spatial distribution of economic activities, and those relationships centred around health/nutrition, education, contraception, fertility and mortality. Closer interaction between social scientists and planners in further synthesizing currently available information will be needed.

If the activities under the ASEAN Population Programme are examined, it will be found that they have indeed provided or can provide additional information on the aforementioned types of population-development interrelationships (e.g. POPDEV II, III; MIGDEV I - III, HEALTH II and MORTALITY III), and have worked out mechanisms for interactions between planners and social scientists (e.g. RESUTIL I and INST DEV II).

Simple awareness of and familiarization with population-development interrelationships arising from these activities, while necessary and useful, are probably not adequate from the standpoint of the integration process. What is needed is for planners to gain confidence in their ability to analyze such interrelationships and to use that information in the formulation of policies and programmes. While learning by doing is ultimately the best way to gain confidence, it might be necessary as a first step for planners to be thoroughly exposed to the full range of population-development interactions through intensive training programmes or orientation workshops. In the Philippines, the Population-Development Planning and Research Project (PDPRP), a project of the Commission on Population (POPCOM) implemented by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) with UNFPA sup-
A study directors' meeting on demographic-economic interrelationships being held at ESCAP with financial assistance from UNFPA.

port, has, among others, implemented training programmes for planners at various levels of Government on population and development planning. The thrust of such training programmes has been to introduce planners to the analysis of population-development interrelationships as a basis for integrating population and development planning. In addition to the formal activities of PDPRP, POPCOM itself through its own initiative has sponsored training programmes on population-development planning for its own staff both at the central and regional levels as well as for selected staff of its partner/participating agencies. Such training programmes or orientation courses can probably be replicated in other ASEAN countries when a need arises. Furthermore, it is possible for ASEAN to develop a population and development planning course as part of its human resource development component. Such a course could complement courses offered by Australian National University and the International Labour Organisation, for example. A core of ASEAN experts could easily be mobilized to design and implement such a course to suit ASEAN development planning needs.

Second, as confidence is gained in analyzing at first a limited subset of population-development relationships, the range of variables to be considered can be expanded. At the same time, quantitative indicators of critical variables can be specified so that data adequacy can be assessed and data collection can be planned more systematically. In this connection, there may be a need to review socio-economic and demographic indicators currently available to determine whether a more refined set, i.e. development indicators that are population denominated, can be constructed according to the manner that
development objectives are specified. For example, it is no longer adequate merely to have indicators of output or aggregate income. One must be able to disaggregate these indicators to show household/personal income by specific subgroup of the population. The rationale for this is that it is not enough that development policies lead to increased aggregate income. What is also essential is that the increased income be experienced by specific population subgroups most in need of income gains. Unless development indicators can quickly pinpoint such groups, it might be difficult to assess the impact of policies and programmes. More specifically, in addition to the collection of data on national income, sectoral incomes, functional income shares etc., it is also essential to collect, regularly and accurately, household or personal income data, which currently may be inadequate and not timely enough for planning and impact evaluation purposes.

Activities undertaken with a view to developing socio-economic and demographic indicators have been pursued in each ASEAN country independently of each other, although instances of sharing and exchange of experiences on a bilateral basis have occurred in the past. This is to be expected since development planning was an ongoing activity in these countries prior to the setting up of the ASEAN Population Programme; in this regard, the ASEAN Social Indicators Project (INDICATORS I) was the first activity of its kind.

A review of existing development indicators, in light of the integration perspective, may uncover gaps that need to be filled; such could form the basis for collaborative activity in the future if there is enough commonality of specific development concerns. In any case, even if such indicators of development are pursued independently by each country in order to maximize flexibility in addressing country-specific concerns, it would still be useful to have some mechanism for the sharing of experiences or the transfer of technology among member countries.

Third, a socio-economic-demographic model needs to be constructed in order to test the quantitative significance of socio-economic-demographic relationships in a country-specific setting. The results of these tests should provide the needed refinements in policy analysis made earlier at the qualitative level. It is important that this quantitative socio-economic-demographic model start out initially as “small”, reflecting the consideration that planners be able to handle it confidently at each stage of the integration process. It is also important that the construction of the quantitative model involve planners at the earlier as well as later stages of construction in order that they may be able to learn to use it for policy analysis once it has been completed, and also in order that the most pressing policy issues that they are currently confronted with can be addressed effectively by the model. As new data and information on population-development interrelationships become available,
conceptualization and modelling activities may be refined and expanded accordingly.

In the development of Phase III of the ASEAN Population Programme, the desirability of collaborative ASEAN activity in the construction of economic-demographic models was discussed. After a review of each country’s experience at economic-demographic modelling as well as each country’s participation in internationally sponsored modelling activities, it was decided that, to avoid duplication of efforts, such modelling activities be pursued on a country basis without formally including them under the activities of the ASEAN Population Programme. At some point in time, however, it might become desirable to exchange modelling experiences to determine how specific economic-demographic development issues common to ASEAN have been addressed by the country-specific models. In the future, it might be worthwhile to consider holding a seminar/workshop such as RESUTIL I or conducting an exchange of personnel programme such as INST DEV II.

Fourth, in addition to aggregative macro models, there is a need to test socio-economic-demographic interrelationships at the micro level. This requires the conduct of systematic impact studies of programmes to determine the extent to which programmes contribute directly and indirectly to the achievement of development objectives. Such information not only helps to validate broad macro interrelationships but is also essential for determining appropriate programmes in the future.

In this regard, several ASEAN projects are most likely to make significant contributions. These projects include specifically POPDEV I and III, MIGDEV I and II, and the evaluation components of WOMEN II and III. At some point in time, it would be necessary to consolidate the experiences gained from these projects towards firming up the methodology for impact evaluation as well as in drawing out lessons for future programme design and implementation.

In conclusion, it is evident that the ASEAN Population Programme contains many elements that can significantly contribute to the integration of population and development planning in each member country. The aforementioned future collaborative activities, which mainly involve a consolidation of experiences already gained, could contribute further to the integration process.

The full integration of population and development planning in each ASEAN country will take some time to achieve and it will be achieved only through serious efforts by the countries concerned. It is expected, however, that individual country efforts could be complemented effectively by joint country efforts under the ASEAN Population Programme.
International Migration

During the past few years, the pace of construction in the Middle East has been slowing and there have been numerous reports indicating that the annual number of migrants from the Asian and Pacific region is decreasing. With the recent decline in the oil revenues of Middle Eastern countries, the future of labour migration has become an even more important consideration for policy-makers and planners in the countries of the migrants' origin.

For these reasons, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) with the financial support of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) organized the Policy Workshop on International Migration in Asia and the Pacific from 15 to 21 October 1986 at Bangkok.

The participants in the Workshop included researchers who had conducted studies on return migration, senior government policy-makers and resource persons. These included 15 persons from nine ESCAP member countries: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Tonga, and one researcher from Italy. Representatives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNFPA participated, as did a representative of the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration.

International labour migration is quite significant to several countries in the region. For example, India, Pakistan and the Philippines have provided the greatest numbers of overseas workers from the region. There were an estimated 930,000 Indian workers in the Middle East in 1983 and 800,000 Pa-...
kistani workers overseas in all countries in 1981. In 1983, there were about 500,000 Filipino workers in the Middle East; workers from the Philippines were also employed in significant numbers in other regions of the world and on ships. There are currently over 300,000 Bangladesh nationals employed in the Middle East. The Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand each had just over 200,000 workers in the Middle East in 1983.

Altogether an estimated 3.5 million workers from the Asian and Pacific region were employed in the Middle East in 1983. Workers' remittances to the region reached $US 8,000-10,000 million per year at that time. Statistics on international labour migration from the Asian and Pacific region, however, are quite incomplete. Even total annual flows or stocks of migrants are not known accurately and more detailed information, such as the number of return migrants or the number migrating again to the Middle East, is lacking altogether in most countries.

One result of the falling number of construction projects in the Middle East is that the skill composition of migrant labourers employed there is changing away from the previous predominance of construction workers. To some extent, more professional and managerial persons would be required, but the major shift is likely to be towards maintenance and service workers.

It is in the area of return international labour migration that government policies of the sending countries have been least adequate. No major policies or programmes for the reintegration of migrant workers have been developed. The few programmes established are intended to channel workers' remittances into productive use. Few special programmes for the reintegration of returnees into the labour force have been created, and only a very low proportion of return migrants have participated in any kind of government programme.

The purpose of the Workshop was to bring together researchers and government policy-makers in order to examine the issues noted above and to recommend feasible policies. The participants examined issues such as the measurement of return migration, the policies of Governments and private companies supplying labour, the reintegration of returned workers (including a review of return migration in Mediterranean Basin Countries for the sake of comparison) and a consideration of the village-level impact of international migration.

Because diversity characterizes the physical, cultural and ethnic features as well as the stages of socio-economic growth of countries comprising the Asian and Pacific region, recommendations which might be appropriate for one country or subregion might not be appropriate for another. Nonetheless, areas of concern common to many countries involved in worker migra-
tion programmes to the Middle East were identified and a number of recommendations, focusing on the consequences of return migration for sending countries, were made.

It was recognized that because demand for labour in the Middle East was undergoing significant changes in both skill and sector composition, the number of migrants likely to return and the skills of new labour emigrants could change noticeably in the near future. Should such changes occur, reintegration of returnees and impacts of the loss of skilled workers could pose serious economic and social problems for sending countries. The Workshop concluded that the paucity of knowledge of the numbers, nationalities and skills of workers in the Middle East would thwart the social and economic plans of countries likely to be significantly affected by the emerging situation. It recommended that, in view of likely significant future changes in the volume and composition of worker migration, a major study should be undertaken as soon as possible to ascertain the stocks of workers (and their skills) in receiving countries in the Middle East. The study should make estimates of likely future demand for labour in the Middle East region, with a view to assessing the likely numbers and composition of worker migration from the Asian and Pacific region during the next five years. Also it should be undertaken by a commission of appropriate experts appointed by the ESCAP secretariat and, in view of the importance which the Workshop accorded that problem, the study should report its findings as soon as possible.

It was also recognized that not only were the determinants and consequences of return migration very complex, but also that some aspects of the process were more appropriately facilitated by one type of organization than by another. Governments clearly played a major role in providing appropriate structures to facilitate the migration and return of migrant workers. Therefore, the Workshop recommended that respective Governments consider the following recommendations:

- As far as possible, Governments of sending countries should ensure that the contracts signed by workers before their departure were fully honoured by employers in receiving countries.
- In view of the reported difficulties experienced by some workers after they reached their destination, Governments of sending countries should provide them, before departure, with clear and concise information concerning their legal rights in receiving countries. Governments should also consider establishing appropriate agencies in receiving countries to assist their nationals in resolving difficulties associated with employment contracts and to meet their cultural and social needs.
While recognizing the important roles played by recruiting agents, the Workshop recommended that Governments investigate and monitor existing systems. Such inquiries could include an appropriate schedule of fees charged contract workers and ways in which illegal recruitment could be eradicated.

Despite the known difficulties of readily utilizing the skills acquired by migrants while abroad, the Governments of sending countries should, in view of the likely increase in return migration, do everything possible to utilize those acquired skills more effectively.

The Workshop saw a need for more intergovernmental activity through international organizations in the field of migration. It therefore made the following recommendations:

- In view of their need for accurate statistics on the volume and composition of migration in order to facilitate planning, Governments should consider adopting appropriate data collection procedures at points of entry and exit. As far as possible, those procedures should be uniform between countries and ESCAP should consult the appropriate international organizations to take steps to promote more standardized definitions, data collection and tabulations.

- Governments of sending countries should give consideration to the creation of a regional charter designed to protect the rights of migrant workers, special attention being accorded to the terms and conditions of their employment.

- Governments should consider making regular contact, perhaps through annual meetings of Governments of labour-sending countries. It was considered that a regular exchange of information on policies and practices could be of considerable benefit to constituent Governments.

- Governments from sending and receiving regions should meet frequently, perhaps at annual conferences arranged through the auspices of appropriate international organizations, to discuss proposals designed to facilitate the resolution of problems concerning international labour migration.

- Consideration should be given by Governments in the Asian and Pacific region to implementing a system of regular information exchange similar to the Systeme d’observation permanente sur les migrations (SOPEMI) (continuous reporting system on migration) established by OECD. The system would give special attention to relevant changes in economic conditions, migration flows and significant changes in migration policies.
Considering the inadequacy of the existing body of knowledge in explaining fully the process of migration from the region, especially to the Middle East, ESCAP should organize relevant research, including policy-oriented research, in co-operation with appropriate national institutions.

In view of the significant impact of remittances on balance of payments, and hence development projects, Governments of sending countries should look more carefully into effective methods of utilizing remittances to achieve national economic objectives. The Workshop therefore made the following recommendations:

- Governments should attempt to obtain relevant information on the magnitude, origin and expenditure of remittances and savings of workers.
- To promote fruitful uses of remittances and savings and to avoid their unwise or inappropriate expenditure by workers and their families, Governments should consider conducting information campaigns designed to assist the recipients, utilizing mass media and other means for the purpose.

Although the Workshop recognized that the role of Governments in these matters was most important, it also recognized that non-governmental agencies and private foundations and researchers could also play an important role, especially relating to the reintegration of returnees. In this context, it recommended that consideration should be given by Governments to appropriate ways of assisting relevant organizations to counsel workers and their families prior to the workers' departure, during their absence and upon their return. Such counselling should include the topics of education of children, the need for regular communication during the workers' absence and the importance of planning for the period after return.

The acknowledged dearth of information on the impact of migration on individuals, households and national economies could be rectified only by basic, ongoing research into all aspects of the process. Two aspects of such research were considered appropriate to the Asian and Pacific region:

- Research should be undertaken on the impact of remittances on local communities with a view to assisting countries to obtain maximum benefit from such expenditure.
- Comparative research utilizing appropriate techniques should be undertaken on the long-term consequences of emigration and return on a selected number of communities in the diverse Asian and Pacific region.
Population and Human Resources*

One of the notes prepared by the secretariat for consideration at the forty-second session of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) focuses on a variety of issues related to population and human resources. Among these are human resources for population and family planning programmes, and the role of ESCAP in developing human resources for such purposes. The aim of the paper is to discuss the types of investments in human resources that are likely to contribute to a continued decline in fertility in the Asian and Pacific region.

Decline in fertility depends on investment in human resources among three groups of people: the first group comprises the 2,700 million people who live in the region; the second, the several hundred thousand people working in family planning programmes in the region; and the third, the relatively small number of professionals working as demographers, statisticians and social scientists in the field of population.

Role of ESCAP

The note considers each of the three groups in detail. In focusing on the third of these, the note explains that ESCAP has adopted several strategies for maintaining and developing the knowledge and skills of population professionals. The first of these has been the dissemination of information. Second, the secretariat upgrades the knowledge and skills of professionals through workshops, meetings and seminars. Third, for nearly 20 years the secretariat has been providing fellowships for demographers from the region to study for a year at the International Institute for Population Sciences, Bombay. Fourth, the

* Copies of this note are available on request from the ESCAP Population Division.
secretariat collaborates in actual training courses in the fields of population information, demography and family planning, and in microcomputers.

**Training in microcomputers**

Recent technology in computing has significantly altered the practice of demographic analysis. For example, the latest of the manuals for demographic analysis published by the Population Division at Headquarters assumes that the analyst has access to a microcomputer. Most analytical techniques have a small data set as input, make numerous mathematical calculations and produce small amounts of output. The note states that microcomputers also enable the analyst to vary his/her assumptions and then see immediately the effects of different assumptions on the outcome. As far as demographic analysis is concerned, microcomputers are not merely substitutes for mainframe computers, they are much better.

A nother advantage of microcomputers is that they eliminate the bureaucratic inefficiency of mainframes. Also, they can be used as word processors, book-keeping and graphical devices, and filing and bibliographic systems, as well as numerical computers. Moreover, it is anticipated that one of the major uses of microcomputers in the future will be to process sample surveys. Indeed, it is now possible to process the entire census of a small country on microcomputers (as assistant in the processing of the 1985 census of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic).

Another important development is the use of microcomputers for management. In some countries, they are used for processing current service statistics and keeping inventories of medical and contraceptive supplies and regulating their flow. Managers can also make population projections and run programmes for target-setting in their offices. Simple tools such as spreadsheets can be very valuable, according to the note.

Microcomputers are especially useful in the poorest countries, which cannot afford to maintain and administer large computer facilities. Because microcomputers are relatively cheap, organizations which are not particularly well funded can expand their scope by using them, the note states.

Given the importance of microcomputers for improving the knowledge and skills of workers in the field of population, the secretariat has embarked on an extensive programme of training in microcomputers. In 1985, six workshops were held on the use of microcomputers for information management, and one on demographic analysis. For 1986, four workshops are planned in information management: one in family planning, one in demographic analysis and two in survey research.