Taking a broad historical perspective, most countries have, to
varying degrees, been influenced by the political, economic, social
and cultural heritage of Europe. This influence has been the predominant
force in shaping the present world and continues to this day.
For example, the political ideals of democracy and nationhood;
economic philosophies of capitalism, socialism and communism;
concepts of human rights, including gender equality and freedom
of speech; and technologies and styles of management are all influenced
by Western thought. Thus, the lifestyles of most people in Asia
and the Pacific have been affected. Often what is considered modern
and progressive is European or, by extension, American in nature.
Most countries of the region have been directly influenced by
the West through colonialism. But even countries that were never
colonized have been shaped by the same forces. Three factors in
particular have influenced post-colonial Asia, namely the colonial
legacy, attempts at nation-building, and the cold war. Countries
that were not colonized still adopted Western forms of government
because these were considered essential to a modern nation-state.
Although some countries broke from the colonial past by creating
new socialist societies, these largely replicated the model of
the former Soviet Union.
Colonialism has had two major adverse impacts on national development
in Asia. First, it shaped the governments in terms of the forms
of political system and attitudes towards politics, law and the
bureaucracy. Second, it helped to create and perpetuate an elite
and middle class who are in tune with and aspire to Western culture
and ideals, but most of whose members are consequently unable
to understand or react to conditions in their own cities. Hence,
too many laws, regulations and practices in Asian government are
still based on an ill-suited colonial model. Thus, settlements
of the poor are seen as disease-ridden eyesores and dens of crime
which need to be eradicated. The approach to the issue of poverty
is based on a combination of indigenous and Western notions of
charity rather than empowerment. The poor are also regarded as
unwitting tools who can be politically exploited for elite and
middle-class ends.
Many of these attitudes were ingrained through formal education
which is still Eurocentric and theoretical in approach. Not surprisingly,
they have been strongly reinforced by donor governments and international
lending institutions which are also largely Western. There has
thus been a continuing tendency to interpret reality through development
models and theories that were conceived in developed countries,
rather than investigating the actual situation and deriving pragmatic
approaches from that research.
The sections that follow explore the implications of this situation
for urban development in the region through three historical phases,
namely post-colonial nation-building, the age of disillusion with
that approach, and the current emergence of a new development
paradigm. These correspond very roughly to the periods from the
1940s to 1970s, from the 1970s to 1990s and the present respectively.
Particular attention is paid to the plight of the urban poor and
low-income settlements. The following papers discuss the options
for future urban development that arise from this analysis.
2. Building the nationstate and
centralization of government
The concept of the modern nation-state is rooted in the European
Enlightenment, a philosophical movement of the eighteenth century
that believed in the power of human reason and that fostered innovations
in political, religious and educational doctrine. It experienced
the demise of feudalism and a reduction in the influence of religion
in nation-building. Democracy replaced the divine right of kings
and nobles. Science and rationalism became the new ideologies.
It was thus the precursor of the industrial revolution. The founding
of the United States of America was a major manifestation of the
new spirit whose concepts were transferred to Asian elites through
colonialism and Western dominance.
After the Second World War, Asian elites tried to impose these
ideals on their newly independent countries. This period, roughly
from the 1940s into the early 1970s, could be regarded as the
era in which countries of the region tried to build modern nationstates.
Countries with diverse ethnic and social structures, most of which
had never formed single political entities before colonialism,
started to build nations which were supposed to act as one entity,
joined by a common national language and sharing a common ideology
and mythology. Even countries that were never colonized underwent
this transformation, in some cases even earlier than those which
were colonized. In Thailand, for example, King Chulalongkorn the
Great decreed around the turn of the century that all citizens
should have Thai surnames, presumably to achieve national unity.
Chinese, the predominant language of Bangkok's trading community,
was banned and Chinese language schools were prohibited. In fact,
until quite recently, Thai children could not study at international
schools.1
National myths were created. In Thailand, for example, the Thai
script was said to have been invented by King Ramkhamhaeng of
Sukhothai. Theories of its evolution from the Divanagri script
of the Indian subcontinent were either ignored or consigned to
academia, far removed from common knowledge. In Malaysia, Indonesia
and Viet Nam, scripts based on Arabic and Chinese were abandoned
for romanized versions because these were considered "modern and
scientific".
The Cultural Revolution in China and the mass depopulation of
cities in Cambodia are other examples of attempts to create new,
"scientific" societies. Myanmar's attempts to suppress ethnic
identities resulted in an ongoing low-intensity civil war in the
eastern and northern parts of the country.
The creation of a modern nation-state was seen to require strong
centralized governments which could create national symbols with
which people could identify. Even in countries with federal systems
of government such as Malaysia and India, political parties which
had won independence from the British retained a strong hold on
power at the centre as well as in the states, thereby assuring
de facto central control over nation-building. But this approach
also required the portrayal of national governments as agents
of progressive change. This view was not difficult for people
to accept during this period owing to the rapid expansion of the
global economy and advances in technology and sciences in which
the new nations shared. For instance, this era saw the emergence
of television as a tool of mass entertainment and communications,
as well as the green revolution in agriculture and rapid, capital-intensive
industrialization. In the social sector, the same growth led to
increases in nutrition and literacy, decreases in child mortality
and increased life expectancy. Thus, the prevalent, easily acceptable
idea was that the development models, whether capitalist or communist,
had been worked out by the developed countries. All developing
countries had to do was to follow the same path.
2.1 Impact on local urban government
Governance in pre-colonial Asia and the Pacific was shaped by
essentially four influences: tribal traditions, divinity and complete
supremacy of the monarch, Confucianism and Islamic Shariah. Divine
rights of rulers and Confucianism, were based on tradition that
all power and authority flowed from the emperor or king, and consequently
every one had to look after his interests.3
While the traditions of tribalism and Islamic Shariah stipulated
that the rulers had to look after the interests of the society
as a whole. Over the course of history all these influences intermingled.
In almost all countries the interests of the monarch or the ruler
were considered paramount. The tradition of "public service",
that the government had to serve the people, was somewhat weak.
Even in countries with tribal traditions and Islamic Shariah,
these were usually distorted to serve the interests of the rulers
and the elite. Moreover, in many societies with tribal democratic
traditions, these gave way to heredity rulership. Often governors
or local officials were removed not because of their poor record
of service to the people but because they displeased the king
or the rulers. At the local level, at least in India4
and in some parts of China,5
there were formal or informal consultative councils of eminent
citizens who advised the ruler of the city. However, the responsibility
of governance rested with individual officials who in many cases
were in charge of both civic and military affairs. In the early
colonial era, the colonizing powers essentially left existing
local government structures intact. It was only in later stages,
towards the second half of the nineteenth century, that local
government structures were formalized, often based on models from
the home country.
Such governments were often non-representative. However, towards
the end of the colonial era, "native" representation was often
allowed in order to meet some of the self-rule demands of the
colonized populations. Because of their colonial nature, these
governments catered primarily to the needs of the administrative
and business elite of the colonizers and their native counterparts.
At independence, however, even these nascent forms of representative
local government were seen as running counter to the requirement
for strong central government. They were therefore often superseded
by centrally appointed civil servants who had veto powers over
the decisions of local councils. In other cases, local councils
were given limited legislative and regulatory powers which were
administered by centrally appointed bureaucrats. This pattern
still continues in many countries today. In Thailand, for example,
cities other than Bangkok have very weak local governments whose
decisions must be cleared by provincial governors appointed by
the Interior Ministry in Bangkok.
As a result of this post-independence focus on developing national
political and administrative structures, local institutional and
administrative development was either ignored or given low priority.
There had in any case never been a tradition of local government
which was often seen as a potential source of upheaval against
central power. Hence career opportunities in local government
were practically non-existent. In many instances, local governments
were seen as impediments to rapid national development and their
limited powers were further curtailed. Most national constitutions,
promulgated after independence, did not consider local government
as a legitimate level for popular representation. Provincial or
national governments were thus empowered to establish or dissolve
local bodies. In Pakistan, for example, a district commissioner
who is often a mid-level bureaucrat of the Pakistan Administrative
Service, can dissolve an elected local council at the behest of
the provincial government.6
Thus instead of building local capacity to manage rapidly growing
cities, top management echelons at the local level were filled
by centrally or provincially appointed civil servants. In India,
Bangladesh and Indonesia, most local administrative decision makers
are members of the national civil service and can be transferred
from city to city or between central and local government at the
behest of the national government.
Local governments were, and in many countries still are, responsible
for the delivery of services and the raising of revenue through
various forms of property tax, other local taxes and the issue
of licenses. However, because their capacities were not developed,
local governments became increasingly unable to maintain the local
tax system. In many countries, therefore, local revenues were
supplemented by central government grants. In Malaysia and Thailand,
for example, 35 per cent of local funds are provided by the national
government as loans or grants. Most of this money is used for
capital investments in urban areas.7
The ability of municipal governments to raise revenue and provide
adequate services continued to deteriorate as city populations
grew while their administrations remained trapped in the bureaucratic
traditions and staffing patterns of the past.
For these reasons, local government service became increasingly
demoralized and underpaid. It offered few career opportunities
to capable and ambitious professionals. This compounded the local
authorities' inability to provide and maintain adequate services
and made it almost impossible to formulate and implement forward-looking
development projects.
In addition to these shortcomings, governance in general, and
local governance in particular, suffers from a duality of traditions.
While formal local governments are a legacy of the colonial era,
the traditional forms and attitudes have also survived to some
extent. The result has been essentially a duality of government
structures, where formal government institutions are set up on
the Western model while governance itself is often carried out
on a traditional and informal system. One often finds mayors,
governors, district officers holding "court" in their offices
and dispensing and receiving favours. Decisions are often arrived
at through informal channels and through personal connections.
This dual system of government results in government institutions
being non-transparent and those controlling them averse to change
in the status quo.
2.2 Economic and physical development
policies and their impact on the poor
The main economic development strategies that were pursued in
the immediate post-independence era were rapid urban industrialization,
particularly among capital-intensive medium and heavy industries,
and increased productivity in the agricultural sector, achieved
through land reform, mechanization and the use of agro-chemicals.
The basic development philosophy in many countries was that rapid
modernization of the industrial and agricultural sectors would
create general wealth that would eventually trickle down to the
urban poor. Within this general context, urban development policies
often concentrated on planning and developing modern cities. Satellite
towns and new subdivisions, on the models of developed countries,
were built. In some countries completely new cities were established.
Le Corbusier, a modern architect-planner, was engaged by the Government
of India to plan Chandigarh, the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana
states. Islamabad is another example -- a city built from scratch,
with wide tree-lined boulevards, according to a master plan developed
by Doxiades, a Greek consultant. Even today it is known as a city
14 kilometres away from the rest of Pakistan.
These strategies, together with advances in education and health
care, had two major impacts on urban areas. First, they led to
a rapid increase in urban populations. Second, they concentrated
additional wealth among the already rich and, to some extent,
the middle classes, at least in the capitalist and mixed economy
countries. These developments, together with centralized government
and the distinct urban bias in government investment policies,
particularly through food and urban services subsidies, then led
to the creation of mega-cities. In Thailand, from 1980 to 1990,
for example, roughly 70 per cent of total government investment
in the urban sector was spent on Bangkok, already a primate city,
while the rest of the funds were shared by all other urban centres.9
In most cases, the poor were essentially left out of this march
towards modernization. Although they were supposed to benefit
from "trickle down", centralized government effectively ensured
that it did not occur. In these processes, decision-making was
dominated by a limited number of politicians, bureaucrats and
leaders in the private sector. The urban poor thus found themselves
marginalized. Nevertheless, the region's cities still constituted
powerful "magnets" so that most of the rapid urban population
growth in the 1950s and 1960s was due to rural-urban migration,
resulting from both push and pull factors. As cities expanded,
another important growth factor was that many peripheral villages
became incorporated into urban areas. Moreover, in some countries,
the struggle for independence also added to urban migration.
The weak institutional base of local government meant that city
planners and managers were unable to cope with this rapid increase
in urban populations. There was already in some cities a backlog
of non-serviced or poorly serviced land in "native" settlements
but these problems were then exacerbated by the influx of fresh
migrants. The result was a rapid increase in urban slums, squatter
settlements and illegal subdivisions where the poor worked at
traditional labour-intensive modes of production.
Similarly, the formal urban economy was unable to absorb the
expanding labour force. While the luckier among the poor found
jobs in formal sector industries or the public sector, the more
enterprising members of the community started small service or
manufacturing ventures to meet their own needs as well as those
of the lower middle classes. However, these small-scale enterprises
were not legally recognized by the government which was, and in
most cases still is, biased towards modern, more capital intensive
activities. The poor thus developed their own mechanisms for providing
housing, employment, social services and finance. Power relations
within the community were often defined by patron-client networks.
In these, the wealthier among the poor dispensed favours and cash
in return for loyalty and various forms of corvée labour.
The formal government response to this unexpected and unwelcome
by-product of development was essentially one of denial. The urban
slum and squatter communities became classified as an under class
that was at best a transient phenomenon which further economic
development would soon eradicate. At worst, they were seen as
aberrations in society which needed to be stamped out. Thus instead
of recognizing the entrepreneurial drive and dynamism of the urban
poor and seeking to encourage it, government officials and other
elites either ignored or tolerated the slums in the hope that
they would eventually disappear. At the other end of the scale,
the communities were harassed as being detrimental to the overall
vision of the cities.
Hence, policies towards the poor, even where these were explicitly
formulated, had a paternalistic air of "government knows best".
The poor were considered incapable of taking care of themselves
otherwise, it was reasoned, they would not have been poor. This
philosophy, together with the notion of a technology-led development
that would eventually benefit everyone, was propagated and supported
by the international donor community. In terms of shelter, this
approach led to the provision of high-rise low-income housing
which had appeared to be a solution to low-income housing problems
in developed countries. Unfortunately, little attempt was made
to understand the socio-economic environments of the supposed
beneficiaries in this region.
These attempts to improve the housing conditions of the urban
poor failed miserably. Governments soon found that provision,
or purchase or rent, of subsidized housing was too expensive for
national budgets. Where such housing was provided at cost, it
proved to be unaffordable by the beneficiaries. Furthermore, as
the poor depended on petty trade and labour-intensive ventures
which often used the house as a place of business, they were unwilling
and ill-suited to live in multi-storey apartments. Moreover, the
informal settlements had developed their own community-based political,
social and economic support systems which government housing,
by its very nature, was unable to provide. Thus, many of those
who had been allocated apartments sold them and moved back to
their slums and illegal settlements. The initial reaction of most
government officials and elites was to blame the poor as ungrateful
and opportunistic money-grubbers. This attitude still prevails
among many government officials, politicians and the social elite.
