
Municipal Land Management in Asia:
A Comparative Study 
|
Chapter 10. Selected initiatives on access to land for the
urban poor
-
- 10.1 Overview
10.2 Sites-and-services schemes
10.3
Settlement upgrading
10.4
Incremental development
10.5 Land-sharing
10.6 Land
readjustment
10.7
Housing cooperatives
10.8 Case-studies
-
- 10.8.1
Overview
10.8.2 Sites-and-services schemes
10.8.3 Settlement upgrading
10.8.4 Land readjustment
10.8.5 Housing cooperatives
In the past Asian cities had a tremendous ability to provide
housing opportunities for its growing populations. Land has
been available in fairly central location because of the loose
structure of the cities and large public landholdings. However,
housing opportunities in many Asian cities have rapidly
been decreasing as there has been a commercialization of the
urban land and rapid increases in land prices. More and more,
land is being purchased by highly organized professional land
developers with access to a considerable amount of capital.
The urban poor have often been forced to move to urban
fringe areas remote from income opportunities and often with
poor access to public transport. In other cases, the
urban poor have to reside on land of poor quality such as
hillsides and swampy areas. Housing opportunities for the
urban poor has become an increasingly urgent task for municipalities
to tackle.
It should be noted that the great majority of shelter is
provided by individuals today through private ownership and
subletting. Renting as a means of getting access to affordable
shelter is becoming more and more common. Most of the initiatives
to provide low-income groups access to land for housing
discussed in this chapter are implemented by governments.
Some issues are relevant for many of the initiatives. For
instance, the comprehensiveness of different programmes for low-income
groups may vary substantially. Some projects provide many
services, whereas some may only provide the most essential
component, land tenure. The importance of security of land
tenure for settlement upgrading has been discussed separately
in chapter 4. Apart from land tenure, the components
which are often included can provide physical, social or economic
development (table 10.1).
Table 10.1. Possible project
components to enhance the living conditions of low-income
groups
| Physical |
Social |
Economic |
| Road infrastructure and footpaths |
Health facilities |
Housing and infrastructure loans |
| Sanitation |
Education facilities |
Small business loans |
| Garbage collection |
Community facilities (parks, playgrounds) |
Employment generation |
| Drainage |
Other community activities |
Training |
| Water |
|
Trade association |
| Street lighting |
|
Establishment of cooperatives |
The core of the matter is income generation. The reason why
the rural population migrates to the city is to earn an income
in order to improve their standard of living. For rural-urban
migrants as well as the larger low-income group born within
the city, a rational decision for shelter is determined by
the proximity to income generating activities. Turner (1980)
recommends that three kilometres from the major employment
centre is an appropriate limit when selecting the location
for sites-and-services schemes although the actual distance
would vary depending on availability of inexpensive transport
and the time needed to cover the distance. The basic problem
with many low-income housing programmes is the location which
have been too far from income-generating activities.
Very few households, independent of income group, can afford
to build or buy a complete house using only their savings.
Low-income groups rarely have any collateral for conventional
loans and they therefore need better access to credit. As
an estimated 40 to 70 per cent of the urban population in
developing countries earn their income from the informal sector
(Choguill, 1994). It imperative to find methods other than
conventional banking to provide loan security.
The technology and building material must be appropriate
for the specific environmental, social, cultural and economic
conditions. In many countries, building standards have been
adopted wholesale from European countries and often need to
be altered. Furthermore, the price of building material has
increased more than median incomes in most countries making
it even more important that locally developed materials and
building methods are used. The difference in construction
affordability between countries was indicated by the World
Bank/Habitat Housing indicator programme which found that
the production costs for 'median dwelling unit' per one square
meter in 1990 was US$97, US$176 and US$145 for countries in
the three lowest income quintiles whereas their respective
median per capita was US$305, US$655 and US$1505 (World Bank,
1993). These figures indicate that the cost of construction
relative to income is much higher in poorer countries.
Subsidies for the provision of housing and infrastructure
should only be provided as a last resort. If governments intend
to provide some type of subsidy, then it should be well-targeted
and provided as a one-time capital grant rather than on an
extended basis such as a housing allowance or interest subsidy
on housing loans in order to avoid market distortions (World
Bank, 1993).
In the discussion of self-help housing, it is also important
to bear in mind that some of the basic inequities in developing
countries would need to be reformed. To generalize large-scale
implications from self-help housing, the "package" would need
to include structural reforms on land taxation, zoning and
market as well as urban planning policies (Gilbert, 1993).
For instance, without lengthy discussions with landowners
and detailed planning, many squatter areas could be zoned
as high-density residential land. Some experts have been critical
of the concept of self-help housing programmes as such:
"By satisfying some of the minimum housing desires of the
urban poor, self-help projects can be said to maintain the
status quo and as such have been eagerly adopted by urban
power élites as multilateral funds have become available
over the last years." (Drakakis-Smith, 1976)
The approaches to provide shelter to low-income groups which
will be discussed in this chapter are commonly used in most
Asian countries. These include sites-and-services schemes
and especially settlement upgrading. It should be observed
that most of the methods can be described as different sides
of the same coin. There are not so many elements that can
differ between the approaches and many projects include a
mix of approaches. The fundamental difference can typically
be found in the approach to land ownership. Apart from sites-and-services
schemes and settlement upgrading, incremental development
is an approach which lets the target group decide when to
develop their land. Figure 10.1 displays the basic difference
between these three concepts and conventional housing programmes.
Figure 10.1. Approaches to
shelter development
Source: UNCHS (1991)
Governments can carry out almost any task in the shelter
development process although they are typically involved in
the provision of land tenure and infrastructure. The beneficiaries
are likely to have more responsibilities in settlement upgrading
schemes and, especially, incremental development. The chapter
will also discuss land-sharing which is a method that relies
on the principle of developing the land for both commercial
and low-income residential use; whereas land readjustment
changes the plot borders within an area, some of the profit
being used for low-income housing. Cooperative housing, especially
condominiums, were increasingly popular as it typically combines
considerable influence for dwellers on their housing unit
with more intensive utilization of expensive land.
Early attempts by governments in developing countries to
provide low-income housing focused on the provision of fully
serviced public housing units. Urban migrants and squatter
settlements were treated with open hostility. They were generally
considered as "dead weight" slowing down the process of development
and their illegal settlements were often flattened with the
help of bulldozers (Doebele, 1983b).
As it became increasingly obvious during the 1960s and 1970s
that attempts to curb rural-urban migration would not succeed
and government housing programmes were completely incapable
of keeping pace with the enormous demand, there was a growing
awareness that alternative methods would have to be found.
Many experts (John Turner being the foremost) advocated that
if low-income groups were provided security of tenure and,
depending on the financial resources of the government, some
basic infrastructure, residents would with time gradually
improve their housing. It was argued that the role of the
government in housing should be changed to be an enabler
rather than provider (Skinner and others, 1987).
The enabling role has ironically been supported by both 'leftist'
and 'rightist' groups, the first mainly because it empowers
local community groups and the latter because it reduces the
burden on the public purse (Hamdi and Goethert, 1989). The
economic advantages with people-based projects were radically
summarized by Turner as:
"The bureaucratic, heteronomous system produces things of
a high standard, at high cost, and of dubious value, while
the autonomous system produces things of extremely varied
standard, but at low cost, and of high use value. In the longer
run, the productivity of centrally administered systems diminishes
as it consumes capital resources, while the productivity of
locally self-governing systems increases as it generates capital
through the investment of income." (Turner, 1976)
Sites-and-services schemes provide the target group with
a plot and basic infrastructure, such as water, roads and
sanitation facilities. The beneficiaries either lease or buy
the allocated land. Often, they are provided access to a loan
with reasonable terms as well as an additional loan for the
construction of a house. Although typically not included in
the project, it is expected that the plot owner would eventually
build a house of reasonable standard. During the 1970s and
1980s, sites-and-services schemes were implemented in nearly
100 countries (Choguill, 1994). The World Bank, for example,
implemented 36 sites-and-services schemes (or settlement upgrading
projects) between 1972 and 1981 worth more than one billion
US dollars and benefitting nearly two million people (World
Bank, 1983).
It is difficult to give a description of a "typical" sites-and-services
scheme as the interpretation of the concept varies substantially.
Some projects only provide pegged-out lots, unpaved roads
and footpaths as well as communal pit latrines and water-taps
while others may even include paved roads, a utility wall
and a partly finished house (Turner, 1980).
There are many physical components to be considered within
schemes. First, a utility wall may be provided which includes
main service connections such as water supply, electricity
and sewerage. Other projects may have a sanitary core while
another solution is communal utilities with the option to
provide individual connections. Second, the layout of the
area depends largely on the planned lot sizes, accessibility
to roads and footpaths, and topography. Often the importance
of the topography has been neglected. Projects have been built
on hillsides and in swampy areas with serious implications.
Communal or individual pit latrines also have an impact on
the lot sizes and therefore indirectly on the population density.
Using individual pit latrines requires physical space for
two latrines as one will be in use. Third, some schemes have
included the construction of posts and a roof, features which
are both expensive and difficult to build. In other instances
some walls or a room have been provided as a temporary solution
while the household built their house (UNCHS, 1991).
The World Bank introduced two terms as general principles
of sites-and-services schemes (Choguill, 1993). First, the
term 'accessibility' was used to indicate that the target
group (the medium-income bracket of the low-income group)
should gain access to the sites in World Bank schemes. However,
because of excessive standards and high costs, the targeted
group often decided to sublet or sell the site and move back
to an area close to his/her original squatter settlement.
Second, because of the magnitude of the problem and the limited
resources of government, the term 'replicability' was an integral
part of all projects. However, for several reasons very few
of these projects managed to break even financially (Choguill,
1994). Three out of four programmes failed to recover the
incurred costs and, subsequently, the World Bank's support
to sites-and-services schemes and squatter settlements has
decreased (Gilbert, 1993). None the less, it would be possible
for governments to obtain cost recovery from increased property
tax revenues.
Cost-recovery has been difficult partly because of the high
expenses which allottees typically have to bear early after
moving into the area. At this stage, they would have to pay
for the infrastructure and construction of the house, while,
at the same time, they may either have high transportation
costs to their old workplace or have not been able to find
a source of income in the new area (UNCHS, 1991). Furthermore,
the method has also been expensive for governments as they
were typically required to provide land which became expensive,
mainly because of land price increases and, to some extent,
land speculation.
Many other problems have been encountered with sites-and-services
schemes over the years and gradually settlements upgrading
has become a more favoured government response to the needs
of low-income groups. Sites-and-services schemes have, often,
proved to be unaffordable or inaccessible for low-income groups.
Some of the problems which have been discussed are:
- Location. Many projects have been situated in the urban
fringe in order to reduce costs for purchasing land. These
locations have often been too far from income-generating
activities. Furthermore, the costs for service provision
have increased because of the distance to the existing service
network;
- Failure to include one or more components. Many projects
have failed to realize how comprehensive a scheme would
have to be. Some examples of common shortcomings are access
to finance, lack of income-generating activities, failure
to mix various income groups (a nearby medium- or high-income
area would, for example, provide income opportunities),
a healthy mix of commercial and residential land use, social
activities such as cinemas etc;
- Selection of eligible households. The process often takes
a very long time and is hampered by problems of defining
criteria for eligibility in order to avoid corruption and
accusations of beneficiaries being selected for political
reasons;
- Standards. Government officials in many countries still
insist on standards which are too expensive for the intended
beneficiaries. Most officials, politicians and professionals
have little contact with the actual economic and physical
realities of low-income groups and have problems accepting
the lower building standards required;
- Administrative delay and shortage of skilled staff. The
provision of some necessary services has sometimes been
delayed for years because various government agencies have
different priorities and lack of coordination. This delay
typically increases the costs for the beneficiaries;
- Removal of community leaders. Sites-and-services schemes
are likely to remove affluent and influential residents
which would leave the squatter settlements without leaders
who could press governments for improved services and more
assistance (Gilbert, 1993).
Although the sites-and-services approach offers many opportunities,
it is not a feasible method for providing housing to the majority
of urban low-income residents because of the huge shortage
in the existing housing stock and high costs. Settlement upgrading
is based on investments already made in the existing housing
stock and is therefore less costly to implement. Settlement
upgrading provides existing settlement dwellers land tenure
as well as some or all of the components indicated in table
10.1, the fundamental feature being the provision of basic
infrastructure. The term "slum upgrading" has been used more
widely in literature for the process. However, as some of
the areas which benefit from an upgrading programme have housing
structures of relatively high standard, the term is somewhat
misleading.
In Calcutta, major upgrading efforts during the 1980s included
provision of roads, standpipes and sanitary latrines as well
as electrification. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development
Authority have been instrumental in the programme which is
estimated to have benefitted nearly two million people (United
Nations, 1986). The Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) in
Indonesia probably rates as the foremost settlement upgrading
achievement in the world. The objectives of the programme
were to provide access roads, footpaths, drainage, sewage
solutions and drinking water and social facilities such as
schools and health centres for urban low- and medium income
groups in Indonesia's popular kampung settlements. KIP/Jakarta,
alone, has improved more than 500 kampungs and provided basic
services to about 3.8 million people (United Nations, 1989).
Indonesia's five-year-plan for 1989-1994 was to be implemented
in 500 cities and included projects for urban renewal encompassing
settlement upgrading programmes (Silas, 1992).
KIP is also a good example of the importance of local support
for upgrading programmes. When the programme was introduced
in 1969 it had a top-down design where officials analysed
communities and imposed their solutions. However, as local
resistance increased it was realized that the programme had
to be reorganized to involve residents in planning, construction
and maintenance of the facilities. Funding was instead channelled
through community-based organizations. Residents became much
more enthusiastic and it was found that they were also willing
to provide substantial amounts of funds (Choguill, 1994).
Today, KIP is an established method and its effectiveness
in the provision of basic infrastructure well recognized.
The process of decision-making is described in figure 10.2.
Initially, if tenure security will be provided, it is essential
to take precautions at an early stage against the inevitable
influx of residents. Low-level aerial photos are relatively
inexpensive and would speed up the process considerably as
it is then possible to identify the existing dwellings and
lots and prevent some of the conflicts.
Figure 10.2. Sequence for
decision-making for settlement upgrading
Source: Buranasiri and Tanphiphat (1984)
Regarding the physical shape of the settlement, it will be
necessary to decide on the layout. It is possible to produce
a relatively regular physical layout within the area which
would make infrastructure provision less costly and more efficient
but would cause conflicts within the area and destroy much
of the existing housing stock. The alternative is minimum
movement of houses which causes fewer conflicts and destruction.
The solutions differ from case to case and innovative solutions
are often required. In Malaysia and the Philippines, for example,
it is sometimes possible to move houses since they are often
made of bamboo (Turner, 1980). As slums and other settlements,
typically, have a very irregular physical layout and houses
are closely packed together, it will be very difficult to
reduce the risk of fire and to provide sanitation facilities
such as pit latrines. If land is very intensively used it
may actually be more cost-effective to build a sewerage system
rather than to reduce densities to make room for individual
or communal latrines. The absolute minimum would, in most
cases, be narrow lanes which provide access to specially designed
handcarts for garbage collection and fire-fighting (Turner,
1980). In any case it is advisable to prepare calculations
of various layout, sanitation and other options so that dwellers
can foresee the economic implications.
An evaluation of settlement upgrading projects from 11 countries
in different parts of the world made the following conclusions
regarding upgrading projects (Skinner and others, 1987):
- Upgrading projects are relatively cost-effective in a
situation of high demand for shelter and services;
- Upgrading projects should be simple and down to earth.
Basic programmes of service provision were relatively successful,
whereas additional components such as income generation
and home improvement credit have been less effective. Simple
programmes have extended coverage and ensures faster implementation;
- Components to improve land tenure had to be carefully
implemented to enhance the perceived land tenure security;
- Increased household mobility appeared to have been exceptional.
The process of more well-off groups moving in (gentrification)
was found in the Calcutta case whereas there was no clear
indication of this type of movement in the Jakarta, Karachi
and Madras cases. Regarding the impact on renting households,
the rents have typically been increased and, sometimes,
the supply of rental accommodation has increased as well.
It appeared that the impact on renters varied between the
cases and that the impact should be considered at an early
stage. It may perhaps be suitable to provide opportunities
for renters in sites-and-services schemes;
- Community participation is essential for the success
of the upgrading programme although it may be important
that the expectations of the upgrading is controlled.
|
Box 10.1. Settlement upgrading
in Sindh
The Government of Pakistan passed the Katchi-Abadis
Regularization Act, regularizing all squatter settlements
(Katchi Abadis) located on government land and built
before 31 March 1985. At the same time, the authorities
announced a freeze on the katchi abadis that could be
regularized. In return for paying a one-time charge
to cover the costs of raw land, internal and external
development as well as a nominal annual rent, squatters
received 99-year leases that could not be transferred
within five years. Although the involved costs were
low, few households applied for titles and cost-recovery
became a major problem. Many residents wanted to see
whether fees would be further reduced or removed completely
(Brennan, 1993).
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) in Sindh Province
has adopted a policy whereby they will only provide
land titles to households which have paid the costs
of raw land and external development and undertaken
internal development themselves. SKAA has taken the approach
to encourage the setting-up of community-based organizations
(CBOs) for the provision of infrastructure. Under
the UNICEF funded Urban Basic Programme, SKAA has been working
closely with the Orangi Pilot Project, a non-governmental
organization, which has proven that CBOs can
provide infrastructure at a substantially lower cost
and at much faster pace than the Government. In
1994, infrastructure was being constructed by CBOs,
funded by squatter households, in several cities in
Sindh including Karachi, Sukkur, Larkana, Shikarpur
and was to be introduced in Hyderabad. As
of the second quarter of 1994, out of total of
1293 katchi abadis, 132 have completed development
works, 201 schemes have been approved and 64,190 households
have been provided land rights (SKAA, 1994).
|
Participatory approaches are important and ideally some form
of partnership between the government, private sector and
community-based organizations should be set up. Often, however,
the success of projects depends on the commitment and efforts
of project staff and residents. The need to adjust approaches
to each project and to find innovative solutions is universal
(IHS, 1993).
Incremental development can be described as a sites-and-services
scheme without the services. The approach includes mechanisms
whereby groups of households are encouraged to organize themselves,
accumulate funds and to provide infrastructure gradually.
Construction begins when the group has collected a certain
percentage of the required funds (Peattie, 1982). The approach
has been implemented in the United Republic of Tanzania and
Zambia as well as Hyderabad, Pakistan.
As with illegal settlements, no infrastructure is provided
except perhaps drinking water. The method has the advantage
that costs are kept as low as possible thereby allowing access
to land for the low-income group. A study of the Hyderabad
case provided the following conclusions (UNCHS, 1991):
- The incremental-development scheme reached low-income
households;
- While incomes of a sizable number of households dropped
initially because of the move to the outskirts of the city,
the development of informal businesses in the settlement
resulted in an increase in income levels;
- The authorities forced residents to save funds and infrastructure
was gradually provided. Furthermore, although there were
no standards on housing, it proved difficult to afford both
infrastructure and housing;
- High-income groups were successfully barred by requiring
permanent occupancy within the area. However, there was
scope to reduce land speculation by residents and illegal
subdividers;
- The Hyderabad case showed that incremental development
was replicable. A comparative study of a nearby sites-and-services
scheme and an illegal subdivision, showed that the incremental-development
approach was the most viable option (Aliani, 1988). However,
Hyderabad was a special case because the demand for land
was not so high in the city and the municipality owned vast
land areas.
Incremental-development has an inherent problem. Projects
bring people together who do not know each other previously
and force them to form a community-based organization. The
consequence is that CBOs have a tendency to break up after
work is finished.
It is obvious that the cost of land in central locations
in cities with considerable development pressure will often
be too expensive for the low-income group. However, it is
also possible to be flexible concerning the payment for obtained
land tenure, by, for example, dividing it into several instalments.
If the land is still too expensive, then the household would
have to find other options in order to find shelter, such
as the rental market.
Land-sharing is a method to alleviate the housing shortages
for the urban poor in Third World countries which has received
considerable attention. From the introduction in Bangkok in
1982 until 1994, seven land-sharing projects had provided
or were about to provide housing for roughly 6,800 families
(ACHR, 1994). In short, land-sharing means that the landowner
and the land occupants (squatters or tenants) reach an agreement
whereby the land owner develops the economically most attractive
part of the plot and the dwellers build houses on the other
part with full or limited land ownership. Land-sharing offers
several advantages as Governments are finding it increasingly
difficult to find land for sites-and-services and other public
housing schemes in locations where there are income-generating
activities nearby, and eviction is increasingly becoming an
unacceptable method to clear land for development projects.
The landowner can obtain the most desired land and the occupants
can continue living in the area.
The land occupants base their right to the land on two major
reasons. Initially, it is common in many rural and traditional
societies that occupants obtain a right to the land from living
on it and the claim on the land gets stronger the longer the
land is occupied. Furthermore, urban development creates land
values as a result of investments by the public sector rather
than by the landowner. Occupants can, therefore, be considered
as having a certain right in the land values as well.
There are four basic characteristics of land-sharing projects.
These include:
- Densification. The occupants will be rehoused
on a smaller area as the land will partly be developed by
the land owner;
- Reconstruction. Densification typically implies
that new buildings will replace older structures. It is
often necessary to build row-houses to allow higher densities.
- Participation. The transformation of the plots
will require a comprehensive negotiation process whereby
the community will discuss the allocation of plots and the
construction modalities with the landowner, often with the
help of a mediator. It is necessary to include all dwellers
in the project and to be able to reach agreements within
the community.
- Cross-subsidy. External subsidies should be
avoided as much as possible. The commercial development
should generate a sufficient surplus to cover a deficit
resulting from the community's inability to pay for much
of the cost of land, infrastructure and possibly housing
(Angel and Chirathamkijkul, 1983)
In contrast to other Third World cities, Bangkok has relatively
few squatter settlements. As a result of a strict law regarding
illegal occupancy, low-income people prefer to reach an agreement
with the landowner for temporarily renting the land. Low-income
areas in Bangkok are therefore typically slums rather than
squatter settlements (Yap, 1992).
The potential for land-sharing appears rather unfavourable
in Bangkok, as the law and many politicians support the landowner
and many slum dwellers accept the landowner's right to terminate
a lease contract and to evict them with no or a small compensation
(Islam and Yap, 1989). Partly supported by non-governmental
and community-based organizations, slum communities have increasingly
become aware of their rights. Community leaders will often
risk harassment, fines and being arrested. Whereas negotiations
between landowners and communities are used more and more
often to solve problems, it is still common for landowners
to resort to arson in order to clear slum communities. The
reasons for landowners participating in a land-sharing project
appears to be either as an act of charity and merit-making
or as the last way out of a conflict situation between the
landowner and the community which is receiving embarrassing
public attention (Islam and Yap, 1989).
Experience has indicated that the chances of reaching an
agreement increases if the community can ask a third party
to negotiate. It is also imperative that the community stays
united in negotiations with the landowner (Islam and Yap,
1989).
An overview of land-sharing projects shows that about 46
per cent of the land was allocated for the slum community
on average (table 10.2). In most cases, the land belonged
to the public sector and the slum dwellers stayed in the area
after land development was completed. It is interesting to
note that the type of development (rental or home ownership)
depended on other factors than on the amount of land available
for the slum community.
Table 10.2. Characteristics
of land-sharing projects
| |
Original Slum
Area (Hectares) |
Percentage
of Land for Slum Community |
Original Number
of Households |
Percentage
of Household Remaining After Land Sharing Project |
Land Ownership |
Type of Land
Tenure |
Average Number
of Households Per Hectare Land After Development |
| Wat Ladbaukaw |
1.60 |
20 |
300 |
22 |
Private |
Freehold |
209 |
| Klong Toey |
N.a. |
N.a. |
1780 |
61 |
Public |
20 Years Leasehold |
N.a. |
| Manang Kasila |
1.75 |
38 |
500 |
40 |
Public |
Year-to-year Lease |
296 |
| Rama Iv1 |
8.50 |
28 |
1000 |
85 |
Public |
20 Years Lease to The Flats |
354 |
| Sam Yod1 |
0.95 |
68 |
210 |
91 |
Public |
20 Years Lease toThe Flats |
295 |
| Soi Sengki1 |
1.10 |
55 |
216 |
92 |
Private |
Freehold |
330 |
| Inthamara 10 |
0.30 |
65 |
85 |
82 |
N.a. |
Freehold |
700 |
| Average |
2.372 |
46 |
5843 |
68 |
- |
- |
3644 |
Sources: Yap (1992) and Asian Coalition for Housing
Rights (1994, Information on land ownership)
1 Project being implemented.
2 The figure without Rama IV is 1.14 hectares.
3 The figure without Klong Toey is 385 households.
4 The figure without Inthamara 10 is 294 households.
Some of the problems which have been encountered with land-sharing
projects include:
- Availability of land. Often the land available
is too small and/or the population density too high within
slum communities. Furthermore, this shortage of land may
force the building of walk-up apartments which generally
are unpopular among slum dwellers.
- Community cohesion. A land-sharing project requires
considerable cooperation efforts among slum dwellers who
often have a different background. This is particularly
a problem during the allocation of plots.
- Complex and time-consuming. The necessity of
community participation and agreement throughout the complex
process is very time-consuming. The delay in implementation
has typically led to increased costs. Furthermore, there
is a problem with enforcement as there are no clear rules
and each individual household has so far had the powers
to block all major decisions. (Yap, 1992)
|
Box 10.2. The Sengki land-sharing
project
The Sengki slum of about 140 households
was located in one of the oldest parts of Bangkok and
the land belonged to close relatives to His Majesty
the King of Thailand. The King's Property Bureau (KPD;
now: Crown Property Bureau) was responsible for the
management of the plot sized 25,080 square metres. A large
part of the slum was demolished by a fire in 1978 and
the landowner, afterwards, terminated the lease of
the land which was affected by the fire. However, most
of the slum dwellers returned and rebuilt less permanent
dwellings owing to the lower tenure security. Some new
dwellers also moved in at the time. Influenced
by the experience of nearby Wat Ladbuakaw land-sharing
project, the Sengki residents asked the National
Housing Authority (NHA) for assistance in a land-sharing
project. A NHA feasibility study showed that the Sengki
slum had several characteristics which made it suitable
for land-sharing:
- There was no serious development pressure on the
land;
- The community had been living on the land for a
considerable period of time;
- The community was well established and residents
relatively close to each other;
- Most households in the area did not belong to the
low-income group;
- Most of the existing housing stock was temporary;
- The leaders of the Sengki slum were keen on the
land-sharing arrangement and could refer to experiences
at Wat Ladbuakaw.
Negotiations on a land transfer started
in 1984. Following KBPs insistence of dealing with the community
as a group rather than individual households, the community
formed the Sengki Housing Cooperative (SHC). Initially,
there was a problem to define who should be the beneficiaries
of the project. NHA wanted to resettle all the households
living in Sengki whereas KPB only recognized the former
(legal) tenants. As the land was not sufficient
for all interest groups, KBP agreed to sell additional
land to SHC. The land was sold at a discounted
average price of 734 baht per square metre (1 US dollar
was equivalent to about 25 baht) compared with the market
rate of 2,000 baht per square metre. At the same time, the
community agreed to vacate the commercially most attractive
land.
The project included many components including
the construction of a main road, some secondary roads
and drainage canals and the provision of electricity
and water supply. The plot sizes were either 22
square metres or about 45 square metres. The average
investment cost was estimated to 105,000 baht per household
without subsidy and 80,000 baht with subsidy. NHA provided
14,000 baht per household for the construction of infrastructure
and the Netherlands Habitat Committee donated about
2,700,000 baht to the project.
The initial problem with allocating plots
had to do with the dynamics of slum communities and
two overlapping communities could be distinguished:
One community before the fire and one after. Among the
households there were absentees with formal KPB-leases,
households which rented land within the slum, households
which moved in after the fire, households which had
moved after the fire etc. It was decided to provide
all households with one plot and to give first priority
to residents who were currently living in the area and
who had lived there before the fire. House renters and
absentee households with formal leases would receive
the smaller plots. After the allocation to the 143 member
households of SHC, nine households did not claim their
land as they felt that committee members had received
better located plots.
A complicated system of cross-subsidies
was developed whereby those with better situated plots
had to pay more for their land. Furthermore, NHA and
SHC decided to charge 13.5 per cent interest instead
of the 9.97 per cent charged by the King's Property
Bureau in order to create a reserve fund against household
defaults. All households were able to pay the downpayment
but some households had problems paying their monthly
instalments. However, by the end of 1991, the repayment
of the loan for the land purchase was still on schedule
and it was to be fully repaid in 1992.
Source: Yap and Angel (1992)
|
It can be observed that land-sharing can only take place
where slums live under a serious threat of eviction as the
community otherwise feels no need for change (Yap, 1992).
Although land-sharing can rarely be used because of the many
preconditions which have to be met, it is one of the very
few methods through which slum dwellers can gain formal access
to land without considerable subsidies.
Next: 10.6 Land readjustment
|