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OPINION NO. 34, S. 1995 |
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Text: This refers to your request for opinion on the proper interpretation of Section 14-A of R.A. No. 1161 (the Social Security Law), as amended, particularly, the provision therein extending Maternity Leave Benefits to covered female members of the Social Security System (SSS). Section 14-A reads: Sec. 140. Maternity Leave Benefit. A covered female employee who has paid at least three monthly maternity contributions in the 12-month period immediately preceding the semester of her childbirth, abortion or miscarriage and who is currently employed shall be paid a daily maternity benefit equivalent to 100 per cent of her average daily salary credit for 45 days subject to the following conditions:
You state that when the aforequoted section was first implemented 1978, the Social Security Commission (SSC) construed the term "childbirth" to be different from that of abortion and miscarriage; and, as a consequence, the System under paragraph (3) of SSS circular 103-T, did not extend the limitation imposed on the availment of maternity leave benefits to "abortions" and/or "miscarriages" which the System distinguished from "childbirth". Pertinently, the said SSS circular provides:
We take it that you construed the term "four deliveries to be synonymous with four "childbirths", so as to miscarriages and abortions" in the computation of the numerical limitation. You raise the query in view of the conflicting views between some members of the SSC and its management on the applicability of the said limitation to "miscarriages and abortions". Particularly, you state that during the meeting of the SSC on January 25, 1995, some members raised the issue that the limitation on the payment of maternity benefits in the law to four (4) deliveries after March 13, 1973 applies not only to deliveries but also to abortions or miscarriages. The Management, however, maintains the view that such limitation of payment of maternity leave benefits does not apply to abortions and miscarriages, which should not be included in the computation. We concur with the view of SSS Management on the issue under consideration. The Management asserts that the terms "deliver", "abortion" and "miscarriage" are not synonymous terms but have different meanings, particularly, that the term "delivery" has been defined as the expulsion or extraction of the child and fetal membranes at birth, while "abortion" is the expulsion from the uterus of the products of contraception before the fetus is viable, and that a "miscarriage" occurs when the body rejects the embryo or developing fetus for whatever reason. We agree with the above-stated Management position. The differences in the usual signification of the terms referred to are well-settled. The term "delivery" means the "act of giving birth", whereas the term "abortion" means "the expulsion of a nonviable fetus"; or the "expulsion of human fetus before it is viable especially between the 12th and 28th weeks of gestation" (see Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Springfield, Massachusetts, U.S.A., 1964). Incidentally, to stress the distinction among the said terms, it may be mentioned that the term "premature delivery" is said to mean "expulsion of the human fetus after the 28th week of gestation but before the normal time" (Ibid.). Examination of the above-quoted provision of paragraph (d) of Section 14-A of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, shows that only the term "deliveries" is employed or used in the provision containing the limitation of the number of times maternity benefits can be availed or after March 13, 1973. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" (Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18).
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