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VI. EXISTING MECHANISMS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING ENFORCEMENT
[ VI | VI-A | VI-B | VI-C | VI-D ]
C. Effectiveness of monitoring
[ C | C-1 | C-2 | C-3 ]
2. Conflicting interests
In the licensing/permit granting framework covered in this chapter, implementation of monitoring responsibilities is carried out not only by the leading agency; the cooperation of several line agencies is also required. For example, the monitoring of operational fishing licences is conducted by the Ministry of Fisheries with the assistance from the Ministry of Marine and Ports and the Ministry of Police.
At times, the Ministry of Marine and Ports has to give more priority to its specific areas of interest, and fishery issues become less important priorities.
The problem becomes worse when budgetary constraints are experienced by any of the line agencies involved.
Further, similar implications arise when the lead agency fails to acknowledge the contributions made by line agencies or holds on to the benefits resulting from the process.
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